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WATER MARKETS AS A TRAGEDY OF THE
ANTICOMMONS
STEPHEN N. BRETSEN* AND PETER J. HILL**
ABSTRACT
In much of the American West water shortages are becoming an
important concern. With increasing demands for water for municipal,
industrial, and environmental uses, transfers of water from the currently
predominant agricultural uses to these other uses should produce eco-
nomic gains. Even though most commodity markets respond rapidly to
price differentials and reduce those differentials over time, water transfers
out of agriculture into higher value uses are not occurring very rapidly.
The existence of multiple rights of exclusion unbundled from the rights
of use under the prior appropriation doctrine in the American West creates
an anticommons that has impeded water transactions. This article explains
the tragedy of the anticommons, describes the various rights of exclusion
that create an anticommons in western water markets, and concludes with
case studies that illustrate the difficulty of water transfers.
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INTRODUCTION
Water shortages are becoming an increasingly important concern
in much of the American West. Urban and environmental demands for
water are increasing rapidly and both physical and institutional con-
straints prevent new water supplies from being developed.' Although
water shortages become headline news during droughts, the major ongoing
dilemma is the need for water to be reallocated from existing agricultural
uses to other uses. In the seventeen western states agricultural irrigation
predominates, using 73% of total water withdrawals.2 Thus not all irri-
gation would need to cease to satisfy the other demands for water. A 5%
decrease in water usage in agricultural irrigation would increase the water
available for municipalities by one third and a 15% decease in irrigation
water usage would double the municipal water supply.
3
With increasing demands for water for municipal, industrial, and
environmental uses, transfers of water from agricultural irrigation to
other uses will produce economic gains. A study of water transfers between
1987 and 2005 revealed dramatic differences in the value of water in
urban uses versus agricultural uses.4 During this time period, the aver-
age transfer price for sales of water from agriculture to urban uses was
$4366 for an annual flow of an acre-foot.5 In contrast, the transfer price
1 Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873,
1873-74 (2005).
2 SusAN S. HuTSON ET AL., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000,8-9
tbl.3 (U.S. Dep't. of Interior, U.S. Geol. Surv. Circ. No. 1268,2004). The seventeen western
states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. Id.
3 Id. at 8-9 tbls.3 & 4.
4 Jedidiah Brewer et al., 2006 Presidential Address: Water Markets in the West: Prices,
Trading and Contractual Forms, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 91, 100 tbl.1 (2008), available at
http'//www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119397861/PDFSTART.
5 Id. An acre-foot is enough water to cover an acre of land with one foot of water, or about
326,700 gallons of water. Id.
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within agriculture was $1747 per acre-foot per year.6 As early as 1992
the mean estimated net gain from the transfer of water in Texas was
$10,000 per acre foot.' Other estimates place the marginal value of water
in municipal and industrial use at three to four times its marginal value
in agricultural uses.8 As these studies reveal, what is especially relevant
for water values is that transfers occur at the margin. While the water
used in agriculture at a particular location may have a reasonably high
average value, the marginal value of the last unit of water used can be
much lower than the average value.
The sharp differentials between the value of water in various uses
have lead to numerous transfers of water out of agriculture.9 Despite these
transfers, water demands for urban and environmental uses are continu-
ing to grow rapidly, and the price gap between the two forms of usage is
growing rather than declining. ° In 2005 the difference in the median sales
price for an agriculture to agriculture sale compared to an agriculture to
urban sale was approximately $7000 per acre-foot per year." Only ten
years earlier the same types of transfers showed almost no difference in
sales prices.'2
The increasing demand for water in alternative uses and the lower
value of water in agriculture creates a puzzling result since most com-
modity markets respond rapidly to price differentials and market arbi-
trage reduces those differentials over time. What is different about water
markets in the American West and why have those differentials grown
rather than decreased? The answer lies in the tragedy of the anticommons
since the existence of multiple rights of exclusion has impeded water trans-
actions by increasing transaction costs. 3 Part I describes the tragedy of the
anticommons. Part II explains how use rights in water are created under
6 Id.
7 Ronald C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu, Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform,
32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265, 274-75 (1992).
8 Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Analysis
of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283,
287 (2001).
Brewer et al., supra note 4, at 107 figs.4, 5 & 6.
'oId. at 101 fig.1.
11d.
12Id.
"3 Transaction costs are the costs of defining, enforcing, and exchanging property rights.
See THRAiNN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 14(1990).
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the prior appropriation doctrine. It also identifies the various rights of ex-
clusion that exist in water transfers generally and in transfers from agri-
cultural irrigation specifically. The combined effect of these multiple rights
of exclusion is an anticommons in the water markets in the American
West. Parts III and IV present two case studies that illustrate the diffi-
culty of water transfers due to the tragedy of the anticommons.
I. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
The tragedy of the anticommons and the tragedy of the commons
provide two similar but opposite points of reference for understanding
how unbundling property rights can increase transaction costs and lead
to economic inefficiencies. "The basic logic is equivalent in the two cases.
The inefficiency arises because the separate decision makers, each of
whom acts in exercise of assigned rights, impose external diseconomies
on others who hold similar rights." 4 The two rights in tension in the twin
tragedies are use rights and rights of exclusion (or veto rights). 5
Michael Heller introduced the concept of the anticommons based
on his observation of retail activity in Moscow after the fall of commu-
nism.16 He was puzzled by the large number of active kiosks on the streets
in front of empty stores.'7 His explanation was that four categories of
right-holders-local government councils, users, balance sheet holders,
and regulators-emerged with the transition from socialist property to
private property and each had the right of veto over the use of storefront
space.' 8 Since a single party who opposed a use could keep the storefront
from being rented or sold, the transaction costs of coordinating all the
veto rights proved to be too great for an entrepreneurial start-up retailer
to overcome. 9 "The tragedy of the storefront anticommons [was] that
owners waste the resource when they failled] to agree on a use."2 ° Thus
1 4 James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons andAnticommons,
43 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 4 (2000).
15Id.
16 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). See MICHAEL A. HELLER, GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY (2008) for additional examples of the anticommons.
17 Heller, supra note 16, at 621.
18 Id. at 636-37.
19 Id. at 639.
2 Id.
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under-use of a scarce resource was the problem, rather than the overuse
of that resource.
The tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons
exist when exclusion rights are separated from use rights.2 The tragedy
of the commons occurs when there are multiple use rights.22 Those who
hold the use rights do not also have the ability to exclude others from
access to a resource.2 In that situation, rents are dissipated by too many
entries into the commons. The tragedy of the anticommons occurs when
there are multiple rights of exclusion or veto rights.' Those who hold the
rights of exclusion effectively undermine the right to use the resource,
especially when exclusion rights and use rights are not necessarily bundled
for all rights holders. The effect is an under-use of the resource. Economic
modeling has revealed a "precise symmetry" between the overutilization
equilibrium characterized by the tragedy of the commons and the under-
utilization equilibrium characterized by the tragedy of the anticommons.25
With a linear demand curve, if there are a finite number of users who do
not hold exclusion rights, the loss will be identical to that experienced
when there is the same number of individuals who have exclusion rights
but do not have use rights.26 Thus, the anticommons becomes "a useful
metaphor for understanding how and why potential economic value can
disappear into the 'black hole' of resource utilization, a wastage that may
be quantitatively comparable to the overutilization wastage employed in
the conventional commons logic."
2 7
21Id. at 623-24; Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 14, at 3-4.
22 Buchanan & Yoon, supra note, 14 at 3.
2 Id.
2,4Id. atl.25 Id. at 7.
26 id.
217 Id. at 2. Smith argues that the fugitive nature of water leads to a combination of
exclusion and governance rules under both the prior appropriation and riparian doctrines.
Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons ofFluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ.
L. REv. 445 (2008). With increasing and disparate demands for water, information costs
may be reduced by using more governance rules under a system that starts primarily with
exclusion rules, as is the case with prior appropriation. See id. at 446. The combination
of exclusion and governance rules creates what Smith calls a semicommons, where "a
pattern of valuable uses requires extensive access by multiple parties." Id. at 476. While
Smith's analysis is helpful, especially in understanding how multiple governance rules
evolve, the difficulties in establishing workable water markets is evidence that the develop-
ment of those governance rules have created an institutional inefficiency-the tragedy
of the anticommons.
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The existence of multiple veto rights over water that are not bun-
dled with use rights make marketing of water difficult in the American
West. In some cases no water trades will occur because of the multiplicity
of veto rights; in other cases the tragedy of the anticommons leads to
protracted and expensive negotiations with the need for side payments
to secure the approval of all concerned. Furthermore, even after water
transfers have been placed under contract, there is still the strong possi-
bility that lawsuits can be brought to invalidate such transfers. Thus, the
tragedy of the anticommons has led to high transaction costs in western
water markets.
II. USE RIGHTS AND EXCLUSION RIGHTS IN WATER TRANSFERS
A. Use Rights in Water Under the Prior Appropriation Doctrine
In the western states ownership of the water resource is vested
in the state. For example, from its ratification in 1876 to the present the
Colorado Constitution has declared that "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the
use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided."28 However, this ownership interest has not given states or,
the public generally, rights in water equivalent to use rights. Thus, the
Colorado Supreme Court has held that this declaration in the Colorado
Constitution "was primarily intended to preserve the historical appropria-
tion system of water rights upon which the irrigation economy in Colorado
was founded, rather than to assure public access to waters for purposes
other than appropriation."29 Similarly, in California, although the state
water code declares that the state owns all water in trust for the people,
the California courts have held that the state is not a property owner in
the traditional sense and must follow the state statutory procedures to
obtain a water right.30 However, such declarations provide the legal
28 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).30California v. Riverside Superior Court, 78 Cal.App.4th 1019,93 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 (2000),
cited in A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., & DAVID H. GETCHEs, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 388 (5th ed. 2002).
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foundation for the states' regulatory role in the creation and transfer of use
rights in water as well as the creation of exclusion rights.3'
Since the state or the public owns the water, the property right
created in water is a usufructuary right.32 These use rights arise in con-
text of the prior appropriation doctrine, which is the predominant form
of water law in the western states.33 Under this doctrine, water rights are
created when a user diverts surface water for a beneficial use.34 Seniority
is granted based on the concept of "first in time, first in right" so that the
first appropriator from a surface water source has rights to the water that
are senior to subsequent, orjunior appropriators.3" Thus, during a drought,
junior appropriators are denied access to water to satisfy the water rights
of the more senior appropriators based on the order of priority.36 The
property right to water in a prior appropriation system "is not a right to
specific water itself, but rather a right to divert a quantity of water, in
accordance with one's priority."37 Although water rights are not perma-
nent, they continue ad infinitum unless they are abandoned or forfeited
for failing to divert the water and make beneficial use of it, either due to
non-use or waste.3" Beginning with Wyoming in 1890, every prior appro-
priation state except for Colorado, which has a system of special water
courts, has replaced common law adjudications with administrative per-
mit based systems to grant water rights to users, to adjudicate abandon-
ments and forfeitures by users, and to review the transfer of water rights
among users.39
3 See Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029.
32E.g., Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205,207 (2007).
' E.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law for
Emerging Water Markets: Common Laws vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861,862-
63 (2001).
' Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in
Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 687 (1997).35 /d.
36Id.
37 JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 30 (rev.
ed. 1999).
s Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the Water
Appropriation System, 83 NEB. L. REV. 458, 490-91 (2004).
31 See Morriss, supra note 33, at 862-63; see also JAMES J. JACOBS, PATRICK T. TYRRELL
& DONALD J. BROSZ, WYOMING WATER LAW: A SUMMARY 2 (2003), available at httpj/seo
.state.wy.us/PDF/b849r.pdf; Melinda Kassen,A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 58, 59 (1999).
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B. Exclusion Rights via Mutual Irrigation Companies and
Irrigation Districts
One of the major factors in the creation of an anticommons is the
way the institutions evolved to control water in the American West. Since
most of the water in question was originally diverted for agricultural ir-
rigation, institutions developed to facilitate diversion of water for that
purpose.4" In addition, adequate water supplies for non-agricultural use
existed at the time these institutions were created. Thus, the institutional
structure facilitated movement of water among agricultural users, but
there was little reason to think of constructing institutions to facilitate
transactions out of agriculture. As a result, the heavy hand of history has
played a large role in water markets today.4
The delivery of water to farmers for irrigation has not been a
simple matter in the American West due to transaction costs.42 The high
degree of asset specificity in irrigation infrastructure and the number of
farmers who receive their water from a single irrigation organization would
lead, according to standard transaction costs theory, to vertical integra-
tion." However, the economies of scale that existed to provide irrigation
infrastructure meant that the optimal size of an irrigation facility was
much larger than the optimal size of a farm.' In 1920 the number of irri-
gated acres per irrigated farm was eighty three while mutual irrigation
companies averaged 1889 acres and irrigation districts were, on average,
9510 acres.45 Given this enormous mismatch, vertical integration would
result in irrigation organizations that would be too small to capture econo-
mies of scale or farms that would be too large to operate in a cost-effective
manner." This disconnection between the optimal size of the irrigated
farm and the irrigation organization meant that alternative organizations
had to evolve in the American West to solve the transaction cost problems
4 See Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West,
25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLy 283, 286-87, 289-90 (2006).41 Id. at 297.
42 Id.
'See generally Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &ECON. 297 (1978) ("[A]s assets
become more specific and more appropriable quasi rents are created... , the costs of
contracting will generally increase more than the costs of vertical integration.").
4Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 290.45 Id. at 290-91.
4Id. at 291.
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of organizing irrigation.17 Two primary forms evolved that are relevant for
the effect of the tragedy of the anticommons on water markets-mutual
irrigation companies and irrigation districts."
General incorporation statutes were passed in all of the western
states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries49 and these
became the basis for mutual irrigation companies.5" Most mutual irriga-
tion companies were not-for-profit since their sole function was to provide
water at cost and allow farmers to overcome the transaction cost problems
of providing irrigation water to their farms." The corporate governance
of a mutual irrigation company consisted of shareholders who elected a
board of directors that provided management supervision for the organi-
zation.52 As in a closely-held corporation, the farmers were typically the
shareholders, board members, and officers of the mutual, thus aligning
the interests of the water user and the water provider." Shares of stock
in the corporation were distributed to the shareholders in accordance with
the articles of incorporation and by-laws. 4 Each share of stock usually
represented a right to water service and the delivery of a specified quan-
tity of water.55 In 1920 incorporated mutuals were responsible for over
35% of irrigated acres in the seventeen western states.5 6 Although the
total acreage irrigated by mutuals was approximately the same in 1978,
other forms of irrigation organizations had increased enough that mutuals
only represented 16% of acres irrigated by that date. 7
Mutual irrigation companies were organized almost exclusively as
a farmer-initiated institution and were designed as a means for farmers
47 Id.
' Commercial irrigation companies were important in the beginning of the irrigation his-
tory of the American West, but because of contracting problems between farmers and the
irrigation companies they were replaced by the mutual irrigation companies and irrigation
districts. By 1978 commercial irrigation companies only provided water to 0.5% of the
irrigated acres in the seventeen western states. Id. at 293 tbl.1.
49 See ADOLPH BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 126-28 (1933).
50 Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 303-05.
51 Id. at 305. Transaction costs are the costs of specifying, monitoring, enforcing, and
trading property rights.
5 2 
Id.
53 Id.
5 Id.
5 5 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANIES 13, 55 (U.S. Dep't of Agric. Tech.
Bull. No. 82, 1929).
" Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 293 tbl.1.57 id.
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to cooperate to deliver water to their agricultural lands.5" Since most of the
mutuals were organized by 1920, there was almost no thought that the
water would ever be more valuable for uses other than raising crops by
the farmers who were members of the mutual.59 Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the rules governing the operation of the mutual were designed
almost entirely to deal with intra-organization transfers.6 ° As a result,
several institutional provisions of mutual irrigation companies make it
difficult for individual members to transfer any of their water rights out-
side of the organization.6
First, in many cases the individual stockholder does not hold the
water rights, but rather they are held by the mutual irrigation company.6"
Since the farmers are the shareholders in the mutual, the issue of whether
the company or the farmers hold the water rights might appear to be a
moot one. However, most of the mutuals also provided governance rules
for any transfer of rights when they were incorporated. In many cases
these rules require an approval by the majority of voting stock.' In theory,
there is no reason why the members of a mutual irrigation company should
necessarily vote against a transfer of a portion of the water out of their use
to a municipal or alternative use as long as the return flow is deducted
from the water transferred. Nevertheless, equity issues loom large when
a farming community votes on a water transfer due to the impact on
both irrigators and non-irrigators, making it difficult to secure a majority
approval for any transfer of water out of the mutual.
Second, perhaps more important than community sentiment and
majoritarian voting rules are the even more stringent rules via the articles
of incorporation and by-laws that prevent or inhibit transfers of water out
of a mutual. In some cases these rules require the approval of the board of
directors to ensure that the transfer will not injure other shareholders or
require service beyond the capabilities of the mutual's irrigation system."
In other cases, rules create an inseverable appurtenance, in which the
shares of stock and hence the water rights are appurtenant or "attached"
'8 Id. at 286-87.
59 Id. at 287.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 B. Delworth Gardner, Institutional Impediments to Efficient Water Allocation, 5 POL'Y
STUDIES REV. 353 (1985).
MId. at 357.
6' HUTCHINS, supra note 55, at 20.
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to the land.65 With appurtenance, the stock and its associated water right
each could not be transferred separate from the other.6 Appurtenance
made sense when water was used almost exclusively for irrigating farm
land within a particular agricultural area since it served to limit transfers
to outsiders who were not a part of the agricultural community. However,
with the increasing differential in the value of water for municipal uses
compared to agriculture, the governance rules of mutual irrigation com-
panies and the ways in which rights were formulated and assigned has
meant that any transfers out of mutuals have been difficult.
Irrigation and conservancy districts are another institutional inno-
vation that provide irrigation water in the West. These districts differ from
mutual companies since they are quasi-public, local government, special
use entities rather than closely-held, non-profit corporations. In 1887
California passed the Wright Act, which was the first legislation that
allowed farmers to form a taxing district to support the construction and
operation of irrigation facilities.67 Table 1 shows the rapid increase in irri-
gation districts in each of the seventeen western states after the passage
of enabling legislation in that state. By 1928 there were 801 irrigation
districts, varying in size from a few hundred acres to over 500,000 acres 8
and by 1930 these districts delivered water to 3,454,272 acres.6 9 Today,
irrigation districts are responsible for approximately one-fourth of the
irrigated acres in the seventeen western states and their total acreage
has increased to 10,769,762.70
65 CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 37, at 286.
6 Id.
67 WELL A. HUTCHINS, SUMMARY OF IRRIGATION-DISTRICT STATUTES OF WESTERN STATES
2 (U.S. Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 103, 1931); see also FRANK ADAMS, IRRIGATION
DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA: 1887-1915 7,8 (Cal. Dep't of Eng'g Bull. No. 2, 1916).
' HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 6 tbl.2; see also DONALD WORSTER, RWVERS OF EMPIRE:
WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
69 Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at tbl.1.
70 Id.
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Irrigation districts have several features that made them uniquely
suited to the further provision of water for farmers.7' In the first place,
they were farmer-initiated since each district was the result of a petition-
ing process.72 In that process farmers who wanted to construct irrigation
facilities, or take over bankrupt irrigation organizations, could ask for the
formation of an irrigation district. 3 Each state specified particular voting
rules for the establishment of the district and, once the district was estab-
lished, it had the power to tax, issue bonds, and use the power of eminent
domain.74 The power to tax and issue bonds was important for overcom-
ing free riding problems when irrigation facilities were constructed and
their popularity indicated that most farmers found them a useful organi-
zational tool for overcoming the transaction costs of providing irrigation
water. The fact that the approval rate was over 90% in irrigation district
formation elections in California indicates that farmers saw the district
as a useful mechanism for reducing transaction costs.75 The high number
of "yes" votes for the formation of irrigation districts also indicates that
farmers were not substantially concerned that the districts would use their
taxing power to inappropriately impose costs greater than its benefits.
Like the mutual irrigation company, the irrigation district was
formed with the single purpose of providing a mechanism for delivering
water to farmers.76 Hence it also contained institutional provisions that
were not particularly well suited for transfers once water became more
valuable outside of the district. In most irrigation districts, the district
itself owns the water rights.77 Placing ownership in the irrigation district
was seen as a way of holding the water rights in a form that could easily
be transferred for the benefit of the landowners within the district without
going through the requirements of the statutory transfer process. In many
cases, the water rights, even though held by the district, were appurtenant
to specific tracts of land."
71 Id. at 313, 316-317, 323.
72 Id. at 319.
" HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 6-8.
71 See John D. Leshy, Special Water Districts-The Historical Background, in SPECIAL
WATERDiSTRICTS: CHALLENGE FORTHE FUTURE 11, 12 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. ed., 1983).
7' Edward P. McDevitt, The Evolution of Irrigation Institutions in California: The Rise
of the Irrigation District, tbl.3.4 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California-Los Angeles, on file with author).
7 Conservancy districts could have multiple purposes, such as developing and delivering
irrigation water and flood control.
77 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, H.E. SELBY & STANLEY W. VOELKER, IRRIGATION-ENTERPRISE
ORGANIZATIONS 49 (U.S. Dep't of Agric. Circ. No. 934, 1953).78 Id.
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As a result, any present day transfer of water by a member of an
irrigation district is subject to a complex set of decision rules and a com-
plicated adjudication process to determine whether the farmer even has
a clear enough water right to enable him or her to transfer it to a user
outside of the district. 79 Even though irrigation districts have public pre-
rogatives, they retain the attributes of a private corporation since its bene-
ficiaries are private landowners and can allocate voting rights and other
costs and benefits in different ways.8 ° In some districts, voting is on the
basis of one vote per water user, while in others it is apportioned by the
amount of water used or the amount of acres irrigated." These different
decision rules have a substantial impact on the way that water transfers
take place. 2 Where voting rules enable all water users to have an equal
vote, it may be difficult for a person who holds a water right to justify the
transaction costs of securing a majority vote for permission to transfer
that right to a municipal or industrial use. For example, in the Imperial
Irrigation District (IID) the one-person, one-vote voting rule made it time
consuming to gain approval for a transfer of water from the IID to the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD)."3 Voting rules that allocate votes
based on the number of acres irrigated within the district may allow a
numerical minority to veto a transfer of water rights out of the district.
In some states irrigation districts have actually been given stronger powers
than those which existed under their original enabling legislation. For
example, in Arizona an irrigation district can stop the transfer of any
water within its particular drainage.'M This, of course, gives a substantial
veto right to an irrigation district over water transfers, even those by indi-
vidual water rights holders who are not part of an irrigation district and
who find it profitable to sell their water right to a non-agricultural user.
9 Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 326-27, 329-330.
o Tim De Young, Discretion Versus Accountability: The Case of Special Water District, in
SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 31, 42 (James N. Corbridge, Jr.
ed., 1983).
81 The constitutionality of restricted and weighted voting systems in irrigation districts
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court under the rationale that one-person, one-
vote requirements do not apply to special purpose districts acting as a business enterprise
and benefitting a specific group of landowners. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 355 (1981).
82 See generally Tim De Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict Between Voting
Rights and Property Privileges, 1982 ARIz. ST. L.J. 419 (1982); John M. McDowell & Keith
Ugone, The Effect of Institutional Setting on Behavior in Public Enterprises: Irrigation
Districts in the West, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 453 (1982).
For a more complete discussion of the IID-MWD transfer see infra Part II.
Susanna Eden et al., Agricultural Water to Municipal Use: The Legal and Institutional
Context for Voluntary Transactions in Arizona, THE WATER REPORT, Dec. 15, 2008, at 9,
available at httpJ/www.thewaterreport.com/Issues%2057%20to%2060.html.
737
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
C. Exclusion Rights via the Bureau of Reclamation
Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century irrigation
projects in the American West were established through substantial pri-
vate efforts using mutual irrigation companies and associations.85 Subse-
quently, the passage of statutes enabled irrigation districts to form and by
1900 there were 7.5 million acres irrigated in the seventeen western states
through localized, bottom-up irrigation institutions.86 However there was
still substantial pressure for federal involvement, and in 1902 Congress
passed reclamation legislation. 7 Funding for the reclamation project was
to come from the sale of public land in the sixteen western states with
arid land.88
Although the original intent of the legislation was to provide irri-
gation water directly to farmers, this proved impractical because of high
transaction costs due to the number of individual farmers, and in 1922
Congress authorized the Secretary of Interior to contract directly with
irrigation districts.89 In 1926 Congress eliminated the possibility of the
Bureau of Reclamation delivering water directly to farmers when it re-
quired that irrigation districts be the only entities that could enter into
a contract with the federal government to receive irrigation water.9°
By 1929, the Bureau had invested enough money for irrigation
projects that the funds invested were 67% of the total bonds that had been
sold by irrigation districts up to that point.9 The Bureau has become an
important supplier of water throughout the West, with 20% of the irri-
gated acres in the seventeen western states receiving at least some portion
of their water from federal reclamation projects.92 Most of the water from
the Bureau projects goes to agriculture.93 A 1996 study by the Bureau
found that 85% of reclamation water is used for irrigation.94
85RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 13-15 (1989).
86Id. at 17 tbl.1-2.
87 See 43 U.S.C. § 391 (2007).
88 PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 654-55 (1968).
8 John D. Leshy, Irrigation Districts in a Changing West-An Overview, 1982 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 345, 345 (1982).
Id. at 360. In 1939 this provision was altered and the Bureau of Reclamation was allowed
to also enter into contracts with mutual irrigation companies. Id. at 360 n.72.
91 Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 318.
Reed D. Benson, Private Rights and Public Authority Over Reclamation Project Water,
16 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 363, 364 (1997).
9 3
1d.
94 Id.
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Because of the heavy involvement of the Bureau in irrigation in
the American West, many potential transfers of water from agriculture
to non-agriculture use involve the Bureau. Unfortunately, the role of the
Bureau in transfers of any water that it has provided to farmers through
irrigation districts is unclear. The Bureau does not have administrative
guidelines that govern water transfers and the Supreme Court rulings on
various issues involving Bureau water do not provide a consistent under-
standing of the role of the Bureau in transfers.95
There are several reasons for the lack of clarity as to whether the
Bureau has to give its approval for transfers of any water from Bureau
projects. In the first place, Bureau water is often mixed with water from
other sources since many Bureau projects provide supplemental water to
existing irrigation organizations.96 Since these organizations were already
delivering water to farmers, the addition of Bureau water confuses owner-
ship issues.
[T]he entire package of rights in reclamation project water
can be thought of, as with other property rights, as a 'bun-
dle of sticks.' In most cases, the sticks of the project water
bundle are divided among at least four entities: the federal
government, the state, the district, and the end user.9 7
Even more confusing is that the rights of each of these entities are not the
same across space and time. This means that a detailed investigation of
each case is necessary to determine who has what decision-making power
with respect to transfers. This lack of uniformity also means a greater prob-
ability of lawsuits since there are precedents, many of them conflicting, in
terms of transfers and the right to approve or disapprove of transfers.9
Second, Congress has generally deferred to state laws with respect
to water rights, especially the state ownership of water and creation of indi-
vidual usufructuary water rights under the western prior appropriation
doctrine.99 Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act specifically expresses
the intention of the federal government to respect state rules governing
water use.'00 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not interpreted this
9 Bruce Driver, The Effect of Reclamation Law on Voluntary Water Transfers, 33 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 26-1, 26-5 to 26-7, 26-14 (1987).
' Benson, supra note 92, at 371.97 Id. at 367.
98 Driver, supra note 95, at 26-5 to 26-6.
Benson, supra note 92, at 375.
oSee Benson, supra note 92, at 375-76 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994)).
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deference to state law to mean the Bureau has no control over how its
water is used, especially when state law conflicts with specific congressional
directives concerning project water.'' Therefore, when it comes to trans-
fers of project water, the Bureau still maintains at least some decision-
making authority.
Third, part of the authority of the federal government over water
transfers comes not from the actual ownership of water rights by the
Bureau, but because of the fact that water is delivered under contract to
irrigation organizations. These contract rights, although not the same
as property rights to water, limit the rights of water users to engage in
transfers.0 2
One of the major contractual restrictions comes from the Reclama-
tion Project Act of 1939, which states that "[n]o contract relating to munic-
ipal water supply or miscellaneous purposes or to electric power or power
privileges shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary, it will
not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes."1° The
United States Supreme Court affirmed that this provision explicitly re-
veals a congressional intent preferring irrigation uses for project water
over municipal and other domestic uses. 04 The ambiguity of the term
"impair the efficiency" means there is a great deal of uncertainty as to
whether a transfer of project water is legitimate or not. Of course that
creates an opportunity for lobbying by various interests since those who
object to the transfers can argue that the efficiency of irrigation has been
impaired.
Fourth, other unclear provisions in the enabling legislation for rec-
lamation projects make transfers difficult. Most project authorizing leg-
islation specifies, at least in a general way, a geographical area that the
project is designed to serve."' This means that many potential transfers
may run into boundary problems since water that is transferred from agri-
cultural to other uses may violate the original boundary provisions.
Fifth, most water transfers are driven by the opportunity for partic-
ipating individuals or groups to profit from a mutually agreed upon trade.
The owner or quasi-owner of the water right expects to be made better
1'oId. at 376-77.
102 Id. at 397.
103 Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 1195 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 485h(c) (2006)).
" City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 630-31 (1962); California v. United States,
438 U.S. 645, 671 (1978).
105 Driver, supra note 95, at 26-18.
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off by either leasing or selling that right to another user and that user is
willing to make the purchase because of the value of the water in an alter-
native use. In an examination of the specific provisions of thirty four con-
tracts,' fifteen of the thirty four contracts place some type of restrictions
on any income that is generated from water resales by those receiving the
water.'07 Six of the thirty four clearly specify that profits cannot be made
until all financial obligations to the Bureau are repaid.0 8 Since there is
a very large remaining obligation to cover costs incurred in the original
construction and ongoing operation of the project in most circumstances,
there is little reason for present water users to consider a water transfer.'0 9
Most of the contracts examined also expressed some sort of limi-
tation on waters end use, with eleven of them specifying only a single use
of that water."0 Again, these types of restrictions make transfers more
difficult, and if they do occur, open the Bureau up to lawsuits for violating
the end use restrictions.
Finally, most of the contracts between the Bureau and water users
specify that the Bureau is not liable for water shortages that may arise
from any underlying alternative claim that is deemed important enough
to trump the rights conveyed in the sale."' As a result, if the Bureau re-
allocates water from irrigation users to other uses in order to satisfy par-
ticular competing demands, such as the Endangered Species Act or the
National Environmental Policy Act, there is no actionable impairment of
the water rights of the original users."' This, of course, dramatically less-
ens the security of any property rights to water that farmers may think
they hold, and also means that farmers have a much less valuable right
106 WAHL, supra note 85, at 157. Thirty-four contracts represents a small sample of the
over 4,000 water contracts under which the Bureau delivers water to users. Id. at 156.
The contracts examined were "chosen with the assistance of the bureau's contracting
officials to represent a wide variety of geographic areas and contracting circumstances."
Id. at 157.
107 Id. at 167.
108 Id.
" Id. at 27. The original user often has repayment obligations much smaller than would
exist for the new user of the water since farmers do not pay interest charges on Bureau
debt and farmers are also subject to "ability to pay" legislation. As a result, the Bureau
water delivered to farmers is heavily subsidized. Id. If the water is transferred to a non-
agricultural use these subsidies cease and the new user must pay a much higher cost for
delivery of the water.
0 WAHL, supra note 85, at 167.
ill Benson, supra note 92, at 399.
112 See Brian E Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POLVY 1, 17 (2002).
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to transfer water to other users. If their water right is not secure or does
not represent a fixed amount of water, it is less likely that transfers will
occur. Thus, when water deliveries were reduced to 50% of the contracted
supplies during 1993 in California's San Joaquin Valley, members of the
Westlands Water District claimed the contractual obligations had been
reduced.1 13 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
United States had not breached its contract to Westland's water users
since the requirements to meet environmental needs trumped the con-
tractual provisions.14 In a period of rising amenity values it may make
sense to transfer water from agricultural to environmental uses. How-
ever, accomplishing this through regulatory decree rather than through
a formal transfer means that greater uncertainty is introduced into the
transfer process. It also means there is a greater likelihood that the mul-
tiple claimants upon the water resource will prevent water from going to
its highest valued use.
Due to all these issues, apparently for any transfers of Bureau
water to be legitimate those transfers would have to be approved by the
Secretary of Interior. 15 Thus, the Bureau generally has the right to refuse
any district or end-user requests to reassign water deliveries to another
party so long as any Bureau water is involved. This discretion, along with
the uncertainty introduced by the numerous provisions specifying the use
to which water will be put, the boundaries of the project area, the possi-
bility that the efficiency of irrigation has been impaired, and the potential
competing claims from environmental uses means that any transfer that
is approved has the potential for being litigated in the court system. There-
fore, any water users who are drawing upon Bureau projects face another
barrier in their attempts to carry out a transfer of that water.
D. Exclusion Rights via the Statutory Transfer Process and the
Public Interest Standard
The high transaction costs created by the statutory procedures in
the western states for selling water rights have discouraged transfers both
among agricultural users and from agricultural uses to urban and envi-
ronmental uses. Traditionally, transaction costs arose when holders of
water rights (i.e., use rights) exercised statutorily granted veto rights to
113 See id. at 17-18.
11 ONeill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 689 (9th Cir. 1995).
... Driver, supra note 95, at 26-9; see also WAHL, supra note 85, at 157.
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the amount of water to be transferred. More recently, state statutory
transfer provisions have been expanded through the concept of the public
interest standard to grant exclusion rights to a broader class of potential
objectors who do not hold water rights.
The transfer of irrigated farmland and its associated water rights
from one farmer to another, who will continue the historical use, does not
normally trigger the requirement for state review and approval."' How-
ever, a transfer of a surface water right, especially from an agricultural use
to other uses, occurs in the context of a change in that water right, either
a change in the point of diversion, the time of diversion, the place of use, or
the type of use."7 Whenever such a change occurs, the water right holder
usually must first receive approval from the state by submitting an appli-
cation with the administrative agency and following the statutorily man-
dated procedures."' Once an application is filed, notices are published or
mailed and opponents can protest the change in the water right."9 "The
major issues that arise in transfer cases are the validity of the original
right (e.g., has it been abandoned?), the extent of the right-especially the
quantity of water historically used, and whether the transfer will cause
injury to other water rights." 2 ° These issues reflect the nature of water as
both a natural resource and a social resource and the interdependencies
created among holders of use rights by the prior appropriation doctrine. 2'
The historical use doctrine recognizes that junior appropriators
rely on both prior filings and adjudications by senior appropriators as well
as the facts on the ground. Allowing junior appropriators to object to the
amount of water to be transferred because the senior appropriator pro-
posing the transfer has not historically used all of the water right or has
wasted water protects the expectations and use rights of the junior appro-
priators.'22 "Early appropriations ... were frequently in excess of actual
116 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKIA. L. REV. 119,
121 (1990).
117 See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-3, 72-5-22-24 (West 2008).
118 MacDonnell, supra note 116, at 121-22.
119C. Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorm and Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45
NAT. RESOURCES J. 169, 176 (2005). ("Typically, notices of the proposed transfer are pub-
lished in local newspapers, and, in some states, individual notices will also be sent to local
water users, water organizations, and community officials. Opponents of the proposed
transfer can then file protests with the state listing legal grounds for why the change
should not be allowed.")
120 MacDonnell, supra note 116, at 127.
121 See GARY D. LIBECAP, OWENS VALLEY REVISITED (2007).
122 See MacDonnell, supra note 116, at 121.
743
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLIY REV.
need because there was no administrative system to police the amounts
claimed."1" In response, the courts argued that "the fundamental purpose
of the change proceeding is to ensure that the true right-that which has
ripened by beneficial use over time-is the one that will prevail in its
changed form." 24
The no injury rule followed in all western states requires the state
to prohibit a change to a water right if the change will injure junior
appropriators. The potential for injury arises because irrigation efficiency
in the western states stands at about 50%, and downstream junior appro-
priators rely on the return flow, which is not part of the transferor's his-
torical use, to satisfy their water rights.'25
If a particular quantity of water is being used over and
over, the value of that water is its worth not just to the first
user, but to all users. If the price just exceeds the value of
the water to the first user, the transfer may be inefficient.
The injury to the junior appropriators who are now without
water may exceed the marginal benefit of the water to the
city. By protecting junior appropriators, the law "inter-
nalizes" that injury and forces the buyer to take it into
account. 1
26
Thus, the no injury rule recognizes the property rights ofjunior appropri-
ators as use holders of water rights even though senior appropriators have
higher priority rights.
Given the economic incentives for junior appropriators to protest
changes in water rights to increase the amount of available water and
given the complex legal, historical, and technical issues that have to be
resolved to determine historical use and noninjury, statutory transfer
proceedings involve high transaction costs. 127 These transaction costs in-
clude the out-of-pocket costs for attorneys' and expert witness fees, hag-
gling during informal negotiations prior to the administrative hearing or
the appeals, holdout problems that increase with the number of junior
'2' JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS
285 (4th ed. 2006).
1" Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55 (Colo. 1999).
125 TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 232.
121 SAX ET AL., supra note 123, at 273-74.
127 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81
CAL. L. REV. 673, 705 (1993).
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appropriators objecting, and the opportunity costs of time since "the aver-
age processing time [for a transfer] appears to range from six months to
one and one-half years (with controversial transfers occasionally taking
up to several years)."'28 The transaction costs are borne most heavily by
the transferor since the initial burden of proof is on the transferor to dem-
onstrate that the water right has not been abandoned or forfeited in whole
or in part and to calculate the historical use and return flows to prove the
lack of harm to downstream junior appropriators.'29 These transaction
costs become a de facto tax on the transfer of water rights and the uncer-
tainty of the outcome creates a chilling effect that deters water right
holders from even initiating a transfer. 3 ° A study of statutory transfer
proceedings in Colorado and New Mexico involving various-sized transfers
"revealed costs that ranged from a few hundred dollars to almost $50,000,"
or an approximate cost increase for smaller transfers of 20% since smaller
transfers do not have the scale economies that allow the transaction costs
to be spread over a larger number of acre feet of water.'3 ' Although sub-
stantial, these transaction costs can be seen as a necessary part of the
definition of property rights because of the return flow issue.
The transaction costs of water marketing have been expanded by
incorporating a general public interest requirement into the statutory
transfer processes. Originally, the concept of the public interest, which
is inherent in state statutes and constitutions that declare the state the
owner of all water resources, was primarily a way of protecting the prop-
erty rights of downstream users or junior appropriators. The expanded
public interest standard, however, creates new exclusion rights separate
from use rights, thus leading to the tragedy of the anticommons in the
transfer of rights.
Initially, the expanded concept of the public interest was incorpo-
rated into the appropriation statutes of western states. Fourteen of the
seventeen western states require state administrative agencies to con-
sider the public interest (or public welfare) when an application is made
for a new water right. 32 For example, in an appropriation hearing for a
128 Id.
1291 d. at 704; see also Ruml, supra note 119, at 176; Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water
Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U. Cmu. L. REV. 1661, 1670 (2004).
130 Ruml, supra note 119, at 178.
131 Thompson, supra note 127, at 705.
132 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (2008); CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-234 (LexisNexis 2008); NEv. REV. STAT.ANN. § 533.370(5) (2008); N.M. STAT. § 72-5-7
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new water right in Idaho, whether or not protested by third parties, the
administrative agency "may reject such application and refuse issuance
of a permit therefore, or may partially approve and grant a permit for a
smaller quantity of water than applied for, or may grant a permit upon con-
ditions" if the proposed use "will conflict with the local public interest,"'33
where the local public interest is defined as "the interests that the people
in the area directly affected by a proposed water use have in the effects of
such use on the public water resource."" The Idaho Supreme Court noted
that "[p]ublic interest provisions appear frequently in the statutes of prior
appropriation states of the West, but are explicated rarely."135 Despite this
problem, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the statutory language
created an affirmative duty to protect the public interest, including aes-
thetic and environmental considerations. 136 In arriving at this interpreta-
tion, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted with approval an observation by
the New Mexico Supreme Court that the "public interest" should be read
broadly to "secure the greatest possible benefit from [the public waters]
for the public."37
As interpreted by courts, the public interest standard not only cre-
ates a broad standard, but also allows multiple third parties to use that stan-
dard to veto a transfer of water rights. In a separate case involving an
amendment to a permit for additional points of diversion, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that parties without use rights could raise objections under the
"local public interest" standard.138 Idaho is not unique since "[miost [western]
states permit any interested party to file a protest although the objections by
holders of use rights are given greater attention."'39
The incorporation of a public interest standard into statutory appro-
priation provisions for new water rights is significant for water transfers
because of the application of appropriation statute standards to the trans-
fer of water rights. The Utah Supreme Court held that an individual with-
out any use rights could protest a change application using the public
(2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06(4) (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(6) (2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2008); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(a)(3)(c) (2007); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290(1) (2008); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2008).
133 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (2008).
134 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202(B)(3) (2008).
135 Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448 (Idaho 1985).
136 Id. at 448-49.
137 Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910).
138 Hardy v. Higginson, 849 P.2d 946, 947 (Idaho 1993).
139 SAX ET AL., supra note 123, at 269 n.16.
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interest standard contained in the statutory appropriation provisions.140
At the time of the case, the Utah statutory appropriation provision stated
the following:
If the state engineer, because of information in his posses-
sion obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise,
has reason to believe that an application to appropriate
water will interfere with its more beneficial use for irriga-
tion, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining
development or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect
public recreation or the natural stream environment, or will
prove detrimental to the public welfare, it is his duty to
withhold his approval or rejection of the application until
he has investigated the matter. If the application does not
meet the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected.14 '
At the same time, the Utah statutory transfer provision stated the
following:
No permanent change shall be made except on the approval
of an application therefore by the state engineer .... The
procedure in the state engineer's office and rights and duties
of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent
changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall
be the same as provided in this title for applications to
appropriate water. 42
A conservancy district and an irrigation company had received prelimi-
nary approval for a change application from the state engineer. The pro-
testing party claimed that his property and nearby property contemplated
for use as a public park flooded as a result of the construction of new diver-
sion works for the transfer so that the permanent change application was
not in the public welfare.' 43 The state engineer concluded that "he was
without authority to address Bonham's claims because Bonham was not
a water user and that the state engineer's authority was limited to in-
vestigating impairments of vested water rights."1' However, the Utah
140 Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1989).
141 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1)(e) (1985).
142 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1980).
1 Bohman, 788 P.2d at 498.
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Supreme Court held that a reasonable interpretation of the text and
purpose of the Utah statutes supported the application of appropriation
criteria to transfers of water rights, including whether a change of use
would "prove detrimental to the public welfare." 45 In particular, the Utah
Supreme Court feared that a two-step process of filing for an appropriation
for one use and subsequently filing a change application for a different
use would allow holders of use rights to eviscerate the intent of the entire
statutory scheme of protecting the public interest.146
A growing number of western states have codified the public in-
terest standard to apply specifically to water transfers and other changes
in water rights. 47 For example, in 1982 California expanded the public
interest provision to read "[tihe board may approve any changes associated
with a transfer ... only if it... does not unreasonably affect the overall
economy of the area from which the water is being transferred."148 Since
1985 in New Mexico, water rights can be
severed from the land, simultaneously transferred and be-
come appurtenant to other land, or may be transferred for
other purposes, without losing priority of right theretofore
established, if such changes can be made without detriment
to existing water rights and are not contrary to conservation
of water with the state and not detrimental to the public
welfare of the state, on the approval of an application of
the owner by the state engineer.
149
New Mexico's public interest requirement is closely associated with
a lawsuit over an application to transfer water from agricultural irriga-
tion to a commercial, recreational use.' Tierra Grande, Inc. and Penasco
Ski Corporation dammed a creek to create a recreational lake for a ski re-
sort in violation of state law and were required to breach the dam.15 1 The
145 Id. at 500.
146 Id. at 502.
147 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222(1) (2008).
148 CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 2007). Similar restrictions have arisen at the county level,
with twenty-two of the fifty-eight counties in the state enacting ordinances that require
permits to export groundwater. These restrictions are largely directed at third-party effects,
or pecuniary externalities. See ELLEN HANACi, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER
IN CALIFORNIA/rHIRD-PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET 59-70 (2003).
149 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (West 2008).
15 Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n, 760 P.2d 787, 788 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
151 Id. at 496.
748 [Vol. 33:723
2009] WATER MARKETS AS A TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
developers then contracted to purchase land and appurtenant surface
water rights from two local property owners to create the lake, subject to
obtaining the approval of the state engineer to the change application. 152
The Ensenada and Park View Ditches used water from the same source
"to water stock in the spring, to fill irrigation reservoirs for use in sum-
mer, and to fertilize the soil with its historically high silt content."153 The
Ensenada Land and Water Association protested the transfer alleging
that it would impair existing rights and would be contrary to the public
interest.54 As in Utah, the New Mexican statutory appropriation provi-
sions had a public interest requirement while the statutory transfer provi-
sions did not, and, as a result, the state engineer refused to hear evidence
that the transfer was contrary to the public interest.'55
On appeal, the state district court reversed the state engineer's
decision on public interest grounds because the ski resort would only
create a few menial jobs for local inhabitants and because the proposed
development would erode the community's agricultural subsistence econ-
omy, which was central to the northern New Mexico culture.156 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court because the statutory
transfer provisions did not contain a public interest standard.'57 How-
ever, between the decisions of the two courts, the New Mexico legislature
amended the statutory transfer provisions to specifically include a public
interest requirement.
15 8
Incorporating a public interest standard into statutory transfer
provisions further increases transfer costs and increases the risk that an
anticommons will develop for three reasons. First, the often undefined
term "public interest"or "public welfare" raises a number of questions in
the context of water markets. "Is 'public welfare' or the 'public interest'
simply the sum of individual's well being" in accordance with utilitarian
152 Id.
153 Id.
1 Id. at 495-96.
155 Sleeper, 760 P.2d at 499.
156 Id.
15 7 Id.
" See generally Shannon A. Parden, The Milagro Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada
Land and Water Association vs. Sleeper: Public Welfare Defies Transfer of Water Rights,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 861 (1989) (exploring"Sleeper's procedural history and analyz[ing]
the court holdings" and discussing the public welfare doctrine); Charles T. DuMars &
Michele Minnis, New Mexico Water Law: Determining Public Welfare Values in Water
Rights Allocation, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 817 (1989) (examining the "concept of public welfare"
in the administrative and judicial settings).
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standards? 59 Is the public interest defined as the interests of all the people
in the state in a particular transfer or just the communities or watersheds
directly affected? 6 ° How is the public interest measured in a public policy
balancing against private interests, especially when a transfer of water
rights from agricultural uses to urban uses represents an economic gain?' 6'
Second, the regulatory authority charged with determining the public in-
terest cannot do so due to limited resources and expertise.'62 Third, public
interest standards allow third parties who do not hold property rights in
water to protest a transfer of water rights. The sheer number of individuals
and entities who are able to file a protest along with the broad nature of the
public interest standard that forms the basis of the protest only increases
the time and costs of a process already fraught with transaction costs. The
cumulative effect of the statutory transfer process and the public interest
standard is to make the transfer of water rights from traditional agricul-
tural uses to higher value municipal, industrial, and environmental uses
even more difficult and unlikely due to a tragedy of the anticommons.
E. Exclusion Rights via the Public Trust Doctrine
The public interest standard is statutory and thus a creature of
the legislature. The public trust doctrine provides an additional, judicially-
enforced means of creating exclusion rights separate from use rights that
can potentially discourage voluntary transfers of water rights in the west-
ern states from lower value agricultural uses to higher value municipal,
industrial and recreational uses. As with the public interest standard
in the statutory transfer process, the anticommons created by the public
trust doctrine arises both because the doctrine expands the number of in-
dividuals and entities who can object to a transfer and because the doc-
trine arms these litigants with additional arguments to employ against the
transfer beyond the traditional arguments of historical use and noninjury
to downstream junior appropriators.
The public trust doctrine has its origins in Roman law and English
common law.163 In both legal systems, the assumption was that the sover-
eign, whether the Roman emperor, the English king, or the Parliament,
159 B. Delworth Gardner, Weakening Water Rights and Efficient Transfers, 19 WATERRES.
DEv. 7, 14 (2003).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 SAX ET AL., supra note 123, at 522.
[Vol. 33:723750
20091 WATER MARKETS AS A TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS
owned all tidal lands up to the high water mark.'" In England, waters
affected by the tide became the definition of navigable waters because
most navigable waterways were tidal. 65 Along with the assumption of
sovereign ownership, three types of interests in navigable waters and sub-
merged lands were recognized: thejus publicum as the common right of
unobstructed navigation, commerce and fishing in navigable waters; the
jus privatum as all private interests in these lands and waters, whether
acquired by custom and usage, prescription, or a conveyance from the sov-
ereign; and thejus regium as the sovereign's powers to regulate navigable
waters and submerged lands on behalf of the public.166 Thejus publicum
did not prevent the creation of the jus privatum, but it did place certain
limits on the jus privatum.167 First, the assumption that the sovereign
held title to the land under navigable waters led to an evidentiary pre-
sumption against the jus privatum.1" While private rights could be cre-
ated, the burden of proof was on the private rights owner to overcome the
presumption that the lands under navigable waters were owned by the
sovereign.'69 Second, the easement-like nature ofthejuspublicum meant
that thejusprivatum was "subject to the public right of navigation, com-
merce and fishing and any obstructions or interference with those uses
were subject of abatement or removal pursuant to an action in nuisance. " "7
After the United States won its independence from Great Britain,
the thirteen original states succeeded to the rights and responsibilities
held by the king and Parliament, and the new states entered the union on
an equal footing with the original states. 7' All state authority was sub-
ject to the powers delegated to the new federal government in the United
States Constitution, such as the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce and thus navigation. Most states adhered to the English com-
mon law system ofjus publicum,jus privatum, and jus regium, subject to
two modifications made by American courts in the nineteenth century.172
164 Id.
1
6 5 
Id.
160 James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL' F. 1, 26 (2007).
167 Id.
168 Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis,
1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 41-49 (1976).
169 Huffman, supra note 166, at 94.
1701d.
171 Id. at 27.
172 Id. at 58-59.
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First, the scope of the public trust doctrine was expanded when
it was adapted to the topographical and hydrological conditions in North
America.173 Since many navigable waters in North America are not tidal,
the English common law system was applied in most states to all waters
that were historically subject to navigation.'74 "In fact reliance on the
English conception of tidal waters in North America would do harm to
the concept of unobstructed navigation since the law that protected nav-
igation would not apply on the vast inland river and lake system (given
the linking of the common right [thejus publicum] to state ownership)."7 5
The "navigable in fact" standard looks to the condition and uses of the
water at the time of statehood.'76 For example, the federal definition of
navigability for title purposes includes "[tihose rivers... [which] are navi-
gable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water."'77 As a result, this definition can include waterways only a few
feet deep that were historically used by flatboats to transport livestock. 7 '
Second, the nature of the public trust doctrine was changed by nine-
teenth century American judicial interpretations of thejus publicum."'
Under English common law, thejus publicum and the rights it granted
to the public of navigation, commerce, and fishing on tidal waters existed
whether the land was owned by the sovereign or was part of the jus pri-
vatum." Thejuspublicum simply reinforced the evidentiary presumption
against the creation of the jus privatum, but this presumption could be
overcome by clear evidence of title, such as an express grant from the sov-
ereign."' However, under American law thejus publicum became linked
to state ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters, so that it was
no longer associated with a rule of evidence but was an attribute of state
sovereignty and title.'82 "By linking thejus publicum to state ownership,
it would be difficult to extend the public rights theory to perceived public
interests in the management and use of privately owned resources.
173 Id. at 29-30.
174 Id. at 30.
17' Huffman, supra note 166, at 96.
176 Id. at 74-75.
177 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
171 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971).
" Huffman, supra note 166, at 97-98.
'
01 Id. at 30.
181 Id. at 94.
182 Id. at 31.
183 Id.
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While extending the public trust doctrine to limit private rights in
natural resources generally has not occurred, private water rights are in
a different position, and, as a result, are less secure.'" The historical con-
text of thejuspublicum and the public trust doctrine has involved water
in general and tidal and navigable waters in particular."5 Thus, the prece-
dent for applying the public trust doctrine to natural resources is strongest
with water and water law based on the common law's analogical reason-
ing and the common law doctrine of stare decisis.'l 6 In addition, because
the state owns the water in the western states pursuant to constitutional
and statutory declarations, the owner of a private water right under the
prior appropriation doctrine possesses only a usufructuary right. 8 7 As a
result, the linkage of the jus publicum to state ownership in American
jurisprudence provides a link between the public trust doctrine and pri-
vate water rights in a prior appropriation system that allows the former
to limit the latter.
8 8
Twentieth century judicial interpretations of the public trust doc-
trine have also expanded its scope in several different ways. First, the
public trust doctrine's historical tethering to navigable waters has been
loosened. 89 For example, the Montana Supreme Court in a case involving
public access rights held "that, under the public trust doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of rec-
reational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes." 90 The California
Supreme Court used the public trust doctrine to reduce appropriative
water rights by limiting the water diverted from both navigable waters
and non-navigable tributaries of navigable lakes and streams that com-
prised the Mono Lake basin.'9 ' Second, the scope of thejuspublicum sub-
ject to the public trust has been expanded.'92 Initially, even though the
United States Supreme Court used broad rhetoric to describe the public
trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,'93 the Court
ultimately aligned itself with English common law by stating that "title
l84Id. at 98-99.
1" Huffman, supra note 166, at 29-30.
186 Id.
l87 Natl Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
's Huffman, supra note 166, at 98-99.
'
99 See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
'9 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984).
191Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 720-21.
192 Huffman, supra note 166, at 99-100.
193 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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to the lands under the navigable waters... is a title held in trust for the
people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties." 94 In more recent
judicial decisions, however the public trust has evolved from a doctrine
addressing navigation and commercial issues to one that also addresses
ecological and recreational issues.'95 The California courts have recog-
nized that the public trust includes "the preservation of those [tide]lands
in their natural state,""9 "non-consumptive or 'instream uses,'"197 and "the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands."' 9
The sum total of all these changes has been to convert the original
jus publicum and the common rights it granted to the public for limited
purposes on navigable waters into a judicially enforceable public interest
standard that can be invoked by a large number of individuals and special
interest groups to enforce a broad spectrum of uses involving a variety
of waterways.'99 Under the modern public trust doctrine, the state is the
trustee of this broadly conceived public interest in water.200 The public
trust becomes an affirmative standard imposed on state legislatures and
administrative agencies to use their police powers, either on their own
initiative or when directed by a court in response to litigation initiated by
exclusion rights holders, to protect this public interest against the private
rights of use holders.20' As described by the California Supreme Court,
"[tihe state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its
navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters... [which] prevents
any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the interests protected by the public trust."2 2 This continuing
power "extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the en-
forcement of the trust against lands long thought to be free of the trust."2 3
This included Los Angeles' rights to divert water from Mono Lake for
'94 Id. at 452.
"' See infra notes 208-10.
'9 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
" United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 103 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
198 Natl Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983).
199 Huffman, supra note 166, at 96.
m Id. at 97.
21 Id. at 96.
0 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.
203 Id. at 723.
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municipal needs pursuant to its water rights and a state permit.2°4 Thus,
in the first clash between private appropriative water rights and the public
trust doctrine over the waters of Mono Lake, the use rights of Los Angeles
were curtailed by the holders of exclusion rights, as represented by the
National Audubon Society.20 5
A transfer of water rights becomes the catalyst under a prior
appropriation system to determine if the diminished quantity of surface
water due to diversions for private water rights violates the public trust. °6
The statutory transfer provisions set the stage for a public trust review
by requiring that notices be sent to exclusion rights holders and by creat-
ing a forum for exercising those rights.20 7 While thejuspublicum originally
represented easement-like common rights held by the public as a whole
that were exercised through the legislature, under the public trust doc-
trine thejus publicum has become "individual rights held in common by
all citizens and enforceable by each citizen acting on his personal behalf
(like a tenancy in common)."28 As a result, under the public trust doctrine
a large number of citizens without use rights have standing to block the
transfer of water rights.2" While the holdup costs of bringing a legal action
invoking the public trust are lowered, the transaction costs of settlement
are increased as the number of potential exclusion rights holders increases
and the ability to enforce a private settlement without encountering objec-
tions decreases.210 Just as the grant of an appropriative water right is no
204/Id.
205 Id. at 728-29. Other western states have refused to adopt California's approach to the
public trust doctrine. The Colorado Supreme Court has held the provisions of the Colorado
Constitution concerning public ownership of the surface waters was primarily intended
to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights on which the irrigation econ-
omy of Colorado was founded, rather than to provide a public right to the recreational use
of all waters in the state. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
[Iun 1996, the Idaho legislature enacted legislation to make it difficult,
if not impossible, for the state to assert a public trust interest in the
state's waters... [by] allow [ing] the alienation of trust lands for agri-
culture, mining and forestry, or other uses and [by] adopt[ing] the federal
bed title test of navigability.
TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 421-22; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-1201-1203
(West 2008).2 6 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
207 Id. at 726-27.
2 Huffman, supra note 166, at 61.
209 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971).
21 0 Gary D. Libecap, The Economic Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 13-14 (2006)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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longer a ministerial act for state water agencies in states adopting the
modern public trust doctrine, the transfer of a water right for these agen-
cies becomes even more complex under the state statutory procedures and
the no-injury rule.2 1' The amorphous public interest standard created by
the public trust doctrine makes use rights already difficult to quantify due
to issues of historical use and return flow even more uncertain. As the
California Supreme Court noted in the Mono Lake case, plaintiffs are not
limited to arguing that diversions are not "reasonable or beneficial," but
"can rely on the public trust doctrine in seeking reconsideration of the
allocation of the waters of the Mono Basin."212 The end result is an anti-
commmons in which exclusion rights prevent the exercise of use rights
and lock water into lower valued agricultural uses rather than allowing
voluntary transfers into higher value municipal, industrial, and environ-
mental uses.
III. CASE STUDY-THE IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT TRANSFERS
California is a good test case for the efficacy of water markets
and for the argument that the tragedy of the anticommons exists in those
markets. The state was one of the first to engage in large scale irrigation
projects and 80% of developed water is used in agriculture."3 Population
growth has also been rapid in the state, particularly in the more arid,
southern region so water has become much more valuable for municipal
use than in farming. The fact that people in Southern California cities pay
100 times more for water than farmers in the Palo Verde Valley is one
measure indicating the potential gain from water transfers.214
The Imperial Irrigation District (IID) uses large amounts of water
and both Los Angeles, San Diego, and their surrounding metropolitan
areas want to have a portion of that water."5 The IID was formed as an
irrigation district in 1911 and in 1928 gained more water when the All
American Canal, one of the major diversions of the Colorado River, was
constructed. As one of the nation's largest irrigation districts, the IID de-
livers water to 495,000 acres of cropland and 25,000 acres of towns and
211 See id. at 12.
212 Natl Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983).
213 BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER IN
CALIFORNIA 3 (2000).214 Id. at 66.
21" Tony Perry, Imperial Water Deal Completed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at B-1.
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parks.216 It also generates power that is sold to 140,000 customers. 217 The
water rights held by the IID are complex. The Imperial Irrigation District
is third in line in terms of entitlements to Colorado River water, with ear-
lier rights held by the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Yuma Project
Reservation District.21 However, the IID has generally been able to claim
2.8 million acre feet a year, partly because it has first priority on water
flowing through the All American Canal.219 This claim is less secure than
it might appear, however, because the Bureau of Reclamation governs
Lake Mead and releases from Lake Mead eventually pass through the All
American Canal and eventually are received by the IID.220 Thus Bureau
cooperation is required for the IID to receive its water, a factor that be-
came important in the 2003 agreement as discussed below.
The first significant transfer of water out of the IID was initiated
in 1985, when the Metropolitan Water District (MWD), which includes
Los Angeles and San Diego, negotiated a forty year agreement to receive
100,000 acre feet a year, with the price set at $100 an acre foot for the first
ten years.221' However, the IID governing board refused to approve the
contract and it wasn't until 1989 that a final agreement was reached.222
The water transferred was to come from conservation measures under-
taken by the IID, because the beneficial use doctrine, as interpreted by the
California courts, meant that water that was not used was forfeited.223
The IID did secure the right to transfer conserved water in this instance,
but the issue of ownership rights to future conserved water was left un-
resolved.224 This interpretation has serious implications for water trans-
fers, since a farmer does not have a right to transfer water unless it is
ruled excess. Thus there is little incentive to move to more efficient use
of water, such as drip irrigation, because doing so will simply reduces the
user's rights.225
216 HADDAD, supra note 213, at 70.
217 Imperial Irrigation District, IID Celebrates Public Power Week, Oct. 5-11 (Oct. 6,
2008), http://www.iid.com/Sub.php?build=view&idr=4946&page2=1&pid=5261.
21" HADDAD, supra note 213, at 71-72.
21 9 Id. at 70.
22 See generally, Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colorado River Operations, httpJ/www
.usbr.gov/lc/riverops.html.
2 HADDAD, supra note 213, at 75.
222 TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 361.
' See SAX ET AL., supra note 123, at 163.21 See HADDAD, supra note 213, at 79.
225 See SAX ET AL., supra note 123, at 163,182-83. California has made several attempts
to reduce the disincentive for water transfers through statutory revisions. Brewer et al.,
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The 1989 agreement is seen by some as a win-win situation and
as a model for future water transfers. 2" However, local opposition to the
transfer arose soon after the agreement was reached and it took an ad-
ditional "five years of negotiations, three agreements, and a side letter
from the MWD related to water banking" to make the original agreement
work.227 "[Although the IID-MWD agreement is hailed as an important
example of a water-market transaction, in its details one finds complex
arrangements involving substantial risks for both sides and numerous
security features .... Ultimately, no water rights transfer ever occurred."'
In 1995, the San Diego County Water Authority ("SDCWA") began
to negotiate with the IID for the transfer of water from agricultural uses
to municipal and industry uses.229 This transfer was complicated by the fact
that San Diego had no way to transport the water unless the Metropolitan
Water District agreed to the use of its canals.' 0 Originally the MWD agreed
to deliver the water for $141 per acre foot but by the time the final agree-
ment was reached SDCWA was paying $250 for delivery and another $250
for the purchase of the water.2"'
In 2003, after eight years of negotiation, appeals to the state gov-
ernment for subsidies, and controversy over the circumstances under
which the IID actually had the right to transfer water, agreement on
delivery of water from IID to SDCWA was reached. However, it was the
direct involvement of the federal government through the Secretary of
the Interior that finally forced agreement. Secretary Norton threatened
to cut California's share of Colorado River water by 11% if the IID did not
agree to move water to San Diego. 2 The threat was based upon the claim
supra note 4, at 95-97. However, there is still considerable uncertainty in this area. See
Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Transfer Act for California, 4
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 23 (1996); CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 2009).
226 TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 30, at 362.
227 HADDAD, supra note 213, at 85.
sId. at 92.
22 Press Release, Coachella Valley Water District Recognition of Coachella as a Player
in San Diego Imperial Water Dispute Seen in IID's Verbal Attack on CVWD (Nov. 18,
1996), available at http://cvwd.org/news/press/cvansii2.htm.
230 DAVID ZETLAND, INST. OF Bus. AND ECON. RES., PAPER XL07'015, FIGHTING AT THE
SPIGOT: THE STORY OF A FAILING PUBLIC WATER COOPERATIVE 2-4 (2007), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.orgcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=iber/xlab.
231 See SAX ETAL., supra note 123, at 733.
2 Feds Warn Lawsuit May Cost Desert Farmers in Southern California Deeper Water Cuts,
U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 2003, http'/uswaternews.com/arcbives/arcrights/3fedwar2
.html [hereinafter Feds Warn].
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of the Interior Department that it could take away IID water because it
was not putting all of it to "reasonable and beneficial use."233
With the real possibility that water would be lost the IID finally
agreed to the water transfer. However, in order to make the deal work, the
State provided a subsidy of $235 million.234 Also, both the public interest
and the public trust doctrines created enough uncertainty about the clar-
ity of rights that the SDCWA and the IID each contributed $10 million
to a fund to mitigate third party effects.235 In 2007 the SDCWA, because
of the threat of liability for economic damages under these doctrines, con-
tributed another $29.5 million to the pool for the third party mitigation
fund.236 Third party effects are notoriously difficult to define and the con-
cept has no clear principle for determining who should receive compensa-
tion and for what amount.237 Almost anyone in southern California could
claim they were affected in some way by water transfers from IID to
SDCWA, either positively or negatively. Furthermore, despite the fact that
$20 million was initially allocated to cover the impact of transfers on in-
dividuals or firms who were not part of the agreement, a comprehensive
study found than the net impact was actually a net gain to third parties
of $1.1 million.23s
233 Id.
234 ZETLAND, supra note 230, at 4; see also Steven P. Erie, Mulholland's Gifts: Further
Reflections Upon Southern California Water Subsidies and Growth, 37 CAL. W. L. REV.
147, 159 (2000).
235 Press Release, San Diego County Water Authority, Agreement Reached on Landmark
Colorado River Water Accords: Hertzberg-Led Negotiations Produce Agreements on
Imperial-San Diego Water Transfer and Quantification Settlement Agreement (Oct. 16,
2002) available at http://www.sdcwa.org/news/101602ColRiverAgreement.phtml. Third
party effects, also known as pecuniary externalities, do not represent an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources. Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy Toward Pecuniary
Externalities, 29 PUB. FIN. REv. 304 (2001). Almost all changes in resource allocation in
a market economy have some negative effects. See DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER: THE
ECONOMIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 271-72 (1996). Either previous users of a resource have to
pay higher prices when a competitor for the resource enters the market, or firms face
lower prices for their product with new entrants into an industry. See generally id. These
types of economic change represent an increase in wealth for the economy overall. See
generally Holcombe & Sobel, supra (arguing pecuniary externalities are necessary to
achieve economic efficiency).
236 Water Authority Ups Its Ante to $40 Million, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRmUNE, May 8,
2007.
M7 See ROLAND N. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEM ANALYSIS
135-36 (1958) (discussing methods of accounting for technological spillovers).
2'3 David Sundig, David Mitchell & Gordon H Kubota, Third-Party Impacts of Land
Fallowing Associated With IID-SDCWA Water Transfer: 2003 and 2004 35, Report for
Local Entity and San Diego County Water Authority (Nov. 2004).
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The process of transferring water from the IID to municipal uses
is a prime example of the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy did
not prevent the transfer, but only because there was an enormous differ-
ence between the value of water in agricultural uses and in urban uses
and because the Secretary of Interior forced the transfer.239 Even so, the
process was long, arduous and costly.240 Furthermore, the transfer is still
subject to lawsuits that may make fulfillment of the terms of the agree-
ment difficult. In September 2006, in response to a suit brought by envi-
ronmentalists and Mexican agricultural interests, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals granted a temporary injunction stopping the lining of the All
American Canal.24' The lining was to prevent seepage and was an impor-
tant part of the water conservation activities necessary to release water
to the SDCWA.
242
IV. CASE STUDY-SANTA FE, THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, AND THE ESTANCIA BASIN
If we don't get this water, I'm certain somebody else will.
-Santa Fe Mayor Larry Delgado243
If the State Engineer's Office received enough letters against
this, they will HAVE to grant us a hearing. This will give us
the time we need to be able togo through the proper channels
to get this water basin adjudicated so that no more water
could be pumped out of this valley in the future.
-Shellie Langley, Ewing area resident of the Estancia Basin'
New Mexico is a relatively arid state with significant water scar-
city issues. 5 Those issues are exacerbated by the state's rapid population
239 See id.240 Id.
"' Consejo De Desarrollo Economico De Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 2007).
242 Feds Warn, supra note 232.
John T. Huddy, SF May Tap Into Salty Water, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 24, 2004.
Shellie Langley, Fight to Keep Water in Estancia Basin, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 12, 2005.
New Mexico Chapter of the American Planning Association, Policy Guide on Water
Planning, Oct. 1, 1998.
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growth.' Most of the growth in New Mexico has been in the urban areas,
particularly in the metropolitan areas of Santa Fe and Albuquerque.24 '
In 2006, 76.5% of the New Mexico's population lived in urban areas while
only 23.5% of the state's population lived in rural areas.248 Despite the
overwhelming concentration of people in the urban areas, water is pri-
marily allocated to agriculture since 95% of surface water diversions and
80% of groundwater withdrawals in New Mexico are for irrigation.4 9 As a
result, transferring water from agricultural uses to urban uses has become
a major issue in New Mexico, and the New Mexico Office of State Engineer
("NMOSE") has estimated that a 10% reduction in agricultural irrigation
would allow New Mexico's population to double.25 °
Due to the lack of rainfall and urban growth, obtaining and main-
taining an adequate supply of water are important civic objectives for the
city and county governments of Santa Fe and Albuquerque.25' Albuquerque
traditionally met its water needs by pumping groundwater from its under-
lying aquifer but discovered conclusively in the 1980s that it was mining
the aquifer.252 Albuquerque has temporarily solved most of its water
problems and reduced its reliance on groundwater due to the Bureau of
Reclamation's San Juan-Chama Project, which, through a system of diver-
sion structures and tunnels, diverts water from the Colorado River basin
U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/35000.html (last visited Apr. 5,2009). From 2000 to 2006, New Mexico's population
increased at an annual rate of 7.5% compared to the national average of 6.4%. Id.
7 See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Albuquerque (city), New Mexico,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/35/3502000.html (last visitedApr. 22,2009); U.S.
Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Santa Fe (city), New Mexico, httpJ/quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/35/3570500.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2009). From 2000 to 2006,
the population of the City of Santa Fe increased at an annual rate of 14.5% from 62,203
to 72,056. Id.
24 Univ. of N.M., The New Mexico Population, httpJ/www.unm.edu/-nvaldes/326/
NMPop06.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
249 HUTSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 8-9, tbl.3 & 4.
250 Leslie Linthicum, From Fields to Homes, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 8, 2003 at B1.
21 WATER ASSEMBLY, SUMMARY OF THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLAN:
2000-2050 1 (vol. 12004), available at http'//www.waterassembly.orgarchives/MRG-Plan/
C-Summaries/Rio%20Grande%20General%20Summary.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY]. Al-
though the middle Rio Grande region receives less than ten inches of precipitation per year,
the region contains "about two-fifths' of the state's population, and is the largest urban
water user in the state" primarily due to Albuquerque. Id.252 WATERASSEMBLY, MIDDLE Rio GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLAN: 2000-2050,2-9 to 2-15
(vol. 12004), available at httpJ/www.waterassembly.org/waterplan.htm (click link"Chap-
ter 2").
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in Colorado to the Rio Grande basin in New Mexico.2" When the San Juan-
Chama Project was first authorized by Congress in 1962, the Bureau expe-
rienced difficulty finding buyers for the water.254 However, Albuquerque
was one of the first buyers in 1963 and contracted for the delivery of 48,200
acre-feet per year, or almost half of the average annual diversion of approx-
imately 100,000 acre-feet. 5 Albuquerque is in the process ofbuilding diver-
sion facilities, pipelines, a pumping station, and a water treatment plant
that will allow the city to divert 94,000 acre-feet per year, consume 47,000
acre-feet per year, and return the rest to the Rio Grande through a sewage
treatment plant.256
However, the Santa Fe area will not benefit substantially from
the San Juan-Chama Project since the city and county only contracted
for 5,605 acre-feet in 1976.257 Further, "Santa Fe allows about half of its
San Juan-Chama allocation-about 2,600 acre-feet-to flow down the Rio
Grande to offset the effects of the city's ground-water pumping on the river
and downstream water users."258 As a result, local governments in the
Santa Fe region are actively searching for other sources of water to meet
their current needs and to avoid growth constraints. Given the large per-
centage of water used in agriculture, both the city and the county have
sought to buy or lease water rights from farmers in rural areas across the
state, which have placed both the buyers and the sellers at the crux of
the water controversy issues in New Mexico.25 9 For example, "Santa Fe
County has been mired for years with Taos County acequias over its plan
to import water from the Top of the World farm" that was purchased near
the Colorado border for its water rights in 2006.260
The Santa Fe region's well known demand for water is increasingly
reflected in the purchase price for water rights. Since 2005, the City of
Santa Fe requires large residential or mixed used developments to transfer
253 Id. at ch. 1, 1-2; U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, San Juan-Chama Project,
available at httpJ/www.usbr.gov/dataweb/htmlsjuanchama.html (last visited Aug. 5,2009).2 4 Tania Soussan, Critical Supply, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 1, 2003.
2 5 Id.; WATER ASSEMBLY, supra note 252, at 2-2.
256 Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority, About the San Juan-Chama
Drinking Water Project, http://www.abcwua.org/content/view/31/24/(last visited Apr. 22,
2009); WATER ASSEMBLY, supra note 252, at 2-2.
5 Soussan, supra note 254; U.S. Dep't of Interior, supra note 253.
2 Russell Max Simon, Area's Water Future Is Flush, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 20, 2006.
259Tania Soussan, N.M. Has History of Water Transfers, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 23, 2005.
06Id.
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water rights to the city as a precondition to receiving building permits.26'
According to Gary Ehlert, executive officer of the Santa Fe Homebuilders
Association, a developer in 2008 must pay between $30,000 and $40,000
for an acre-foot of water.262 Yet, in 2007, farmers in the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District ("MRGCD") south of the Santa Fe region were paying
$28 per acre foot for their water, even though the WaterBank, a water
rights brokerage firm based in Albuquerque, had sent letters to landowners
in the MRGCD offering to buy adjudicated water rights for up to $14,000
per acre-foot. 2 3 With farmers paying tens of dollars per acre-foot for water
for irrigation and developers, cities, and urbanized counties paying tens
of thousands of dollars per acre-foot for water for residential and commer-
cial uses, it is clear that there would be huge gains from trade. However,
due to the tragedy of the anticommons, water transfers from the MRGCD
are neither quick nor certain.2 4
A. The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
The MRGCD is a multipurpose special water district created in
1925 to address problems arising from and related to agricultural irriga-
tion.265 After reaching a peak in the 1880s, the number of irrigated acres
in the middle valley of the Rio Grande declined due to the river's dimin-
ished flows caused by the development of irrigated agriculture upstream
in the San Luis Valley of Colorado.2 6 The diminished flows reduced the
261 Laura Banish, New Water-Rights Law Upsets Developers, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 28,
2005, at 3.
262 Telephone interview with Peter J. Hill in Santa Fe, N.M. (July 7, 2008).
21 Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, It's Rematch ForMRGCD in Valencia, ALBUQUERQUEJ., June 1,
2007,; Water Rights Put Out to Bid, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 15, 2006. The farmers in the
MRGCD are being subsidized at $28 an acre foot. Id. Based on this figure, one can cal-
culate approximate costs of water for the MRGCD from its annual budgets. In 2007 the
MRGCD had expenditures of $15.8 million and provided 345,000 acre feet ofwater. Juan-
Carlos Rodriguez, MRGCD Spared '07 Water Shortage, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 16, 2007;
Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, Findings In Audit of MRGCD Improve, ALBUQUERQUE J., March
12, 2008. Thus, water costs are approximately $46 an acre foot. The figures vary
somewhat from year to year depending on the amount of water delivered, but are always
several orders of magnitude less than the value of water in surrounding cities.
264 See sources cited supra note 263.
265 Stephen A. Thompson, Urbanization and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District,
76 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 35, 41 (1986).
266 Id. at 37; Lisa D. Brown, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's Protected
Water Rights: Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public Interest in New Mexico?, 40 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1, 4-5 (2000).
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Rio Grande's carrying capacity, increased sedimentation, and caused the
river channel to aggrade and the water table to rise.267 The resulting
waterlogged soils, alkali flats, and flooding reduced the land available for
agriculture and devastated the local economy.2" In response, a small group
of Albuquerque business owners and landowners successfully lobbied the
legislature for the creation of a conservancy district to protect their prop-
erty interests and stimulate the regional economy.269
The Conservancy Act of 1923 authorized the formation of the
MRGCD for flood protection, river control, and land drainage. 7 ' The
Conservancy Act "provided that the organizing petition be signed 'either
by one hundred (100) owners of land, or by a majority of the owners of
land situated within the limits of the territory proposed to be organized
into a district,'" and the MRGCD was formed on the basis of 148 signa-
tures. 17 ' A majority of landowners opposed forming the MRGCD due to
its power to compel the inclusion of all lands benefitted by its services
and their concern about being able to pay the mandatory assessments.2
Despite this opposition, the MRGCD was duly established as a conser-
vancy district by a district court order in August 1925,273 and the consti-
tutionality of the MRGCD's formation was confirmed by the New Mexico
Supreme Court that same year. 4 The Conservancy Act was amended in
1927 to both require more signatures on the formation petition and to
include provisions for agricultural irrigation.27
267 Brown, supra note 266, at 5.
268 Thompson, supra note 265, at 37.
2 9 John R. Brown, "Whiskey's fer Drinkin'; Water's fer Fightin'!" Is It? Resolving a Collective
Action Dilemma in New Mexico, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 185, 206 (2003); Brown, supra
note 266, at 5.2 0 See The Conservancy Act of New Mexico, 1923 N.M. Laws 140 (codified at N.M. STAT.
§§ 73-14-1 to -5 (1978).
271 Id.; see also Mary Humphrey, The New Mexico Conservancy Act 33 (Nov. 1998)
(unpublished manuscript).
272 Brown, supra note 266, at 6; Thompson, supra note 265, at 39.
273 CHARLES T. DuMARS, DAvID SEELEY & TANYA L. Scorr, THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
CONSERvANCY DISTRICTWATER BANKLEASING PROGRAM 1 (2007), available at http://www
.mrgcd.com/content.asp?IntLinkKey=277611&CustComKey=277608&CategoryKey=
277609&pn=LinkslntView&domname=mrgcd.com.
" Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 242 P. 683 (N.M. 1925).
275 1927 N.M. Laws 45, §§ 201,910 (codified as N.M. Stat. §§ 73-17-23,72-17-21(2008)). The
formation of irrigation districts was often approved by overwhelming majorities in the
American West. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 40, at 328. Resistance to the formation of
the MRGCD by farmers might be traced to two factors. First, unlike an irrigation district,
the MRGCD is a conservancy district and was originally formed for purposes other than
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The MRGCD extends 150 miles from the Cochiti Dam in the north
to the Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge in the south and encom-
passes most of the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Within its boundaries are
four counties, five cities, including Albuquerque, New Mexico's largest city,
and over a quarter of New Mexico's population." 6 Although the MRGCD
contains 278,000 acres and 128,787 of those acres are irrigable, only about
70,000 acres are actually irrigated by the 11,000 farmers who receive
water from the MRGCD.2 7' To deliver this water, the MRGCD manages
and maintains four diversion dams and reservoirs, 834 miles of canals and
ditches, and 404 miles of riverside drains.278 The construction of water
storage facilities by the MRGCD and the reduction in discharge from agri-
cultural irrigation due to the expansion of the Albuquerque metropolitan
area decreased the risk of flooding. The MRGCD's success in reclaiming
lands combined with municipal groundwater pumping that has lowered
the water table in urban Bernalillo County means that drainage is no
longer an important concern 9 Instead, the MRGCD exists today pri-
marily to support agricultural irrigation.28 ° However, as the number of
agricultural irrigation. Provisions for irrigation that more directly benefited agriculture
were not added to the statutory scheme until the 1927 Act. This original focus was not
surprising since urban business interests rather than agricultural interests appear to
have been instrumental in persuading the legislature to pass the 1923 Act. Thompson,
supra note 265, at 38. The business coalition included the Albuquerque Chamber of
Commerce, the Albuquerque Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, and the Albuquerque Board of
Realtors, which joined with large landowners to form a group called the Rio Grande
Association. Brown, supra note 266, at 5. The priority given to flood control "might have
reflected the primary concern of the district's core supporters from the business commu-
nity, who apparently perceived the flood hazard as the greatest threat to their vision of
future development in the valley." Thompson, supra note 265, at 39. Second, the district's
original governance structure was highly undemocratic because the board of directors
was appointed by judges. Id. at 39-40. This political arrangement might have led to the
appointment of directors who were sympathetic to the interests of politically influential
business persons and large landowners, rather than smaller farmers.
276 Thompson, supra note 265, at 39; SUBHAS SHAH, THE MIDDLE Rio GRANDE CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT: SUSTAINING THE MIDDLE VALLEY FOR OVER 70 YEARS 2-3 (2000). At the time his
article was written, Subhas Shah was the Chief Engineer for the MRGCD, and he is
currently both its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Engineer.
277 Id. at 3; Michael Davis, Irrigation Season "Went Really Well," ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 15,
2005, at 1.
278 SHAH, supra note 276, at 3.
279 Brown, supra note 266, at 206; Thompson, supra note 265, at 46.
280 See MIDDLE Rio GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, A LITTLE HISTORY, THE MRGCD
OVERTHE YEARS, http'//www.mrgcd.com/cms/kundetrts/mrgcdcomdocs/619590059-05-25-
2007-13-35-52.pdf.
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acres devoted to agriculture decreases due to urbanization, the MRGCD
has also "portrayed itself as a guardian of riparian habitat, and essential
partner in protecting the ecology of the river through its lands and ditch
systems, and enhancer of recreational values, and a major source of re-
charge to the Albuquerque acquifer."28 '
Since 1956, the NMOSE has considered the Rio Grande Basin to be
fully appropriated.2"2 Permits are no longer issued for new surface water
appropriations and permits for new groundwater diversions are deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis in accordance with conjunctive manage-
ment principles.283 Growing municipalities seeking water must retire or
transfer existing water rights.2' Given its location near and among cities
experiencing rapid growth, such as Albuquerque and Santa Fe, and the
differentials in value between agricultural and urban uses of water, the
MRGCD should be a likely source of water for these growing municipalities.
However, the MRGCD does not transfer water rights. The MRGCD
has a strong commitment to maintaining control over the region's water
and to restrict its use to agricultural irrigation. The MRGCD's stated policy
is "to see as much water as possible remain in agriculture."28 According
to Dennis Domrzalski, spokesperson for the MRGCD, "[wie want to keep
this valley forever green, and the way we do that is to keep agricultural
land in production, and the way we do that is to keep water available to
those lands."2"6 The Middle Rio Grande Water Plan notes that "the 1930
water rights developed by the [MRGCD] have never been available for
transfer."8" The MRGCD's policies are reinforced by the NMOSE's policies
of not allowing individual farmers to sell water rights arising from the
MRGCD's permits, even though there is no state law prohibiting such
transfers.288 However, underlying these policies are water rights whose
uncertainties would be explored in a transfer due to the tragedy of the
anticommons. Several factors combine to create this anticommons." 9
21 Brown, supra note 269, at 207.
282 WATER ASSEMBLY, supra note 252, at 2-2.
28 THOMAS C. TURNEY, OFFICE OF THE N.M. STATE ENGR, MIDDLE Rio GRANDE
ADMINISTRATIVE AREA GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS 2 (2000).2 4 Id.
285 SHAH, supra note 276, at 5.
' Water Rights, infra note 320.
287 WATER ASSEMBLY, supra note 252, at 2-1.
2 8 Tania Soussan, Village Challenging Water Rights Policy, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 24,
2006, at D3. Municipalities are seeking a test case to challenge both the MRGCD's and
the NMOSE's policies. Id.
' See Brown, supra note 269, at 207-08.
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The first factor is the mixed and uncertain nature of the ownership
of water rights within the MRGCD. When the New Mexico water code was
enacted in 1907, existing water rights created by diversion and beneficial
use were affirmed and did not require a permit from the NMOSE to con-
firm their priority date.' The MRGCD took the position that some of these
pre-1907 water rights are appurtenant to 80,785 acres of land within the
MRGCD.29' However, since pre-1907 water rights are vested in the user
and pre-date the creation of the MRGCD, individual landowners who hold
such rights within the MRGCD can transfer them without obtaining the
approval of the MRGCD. While the MRGCD has taken the position that
pre-1907 are transferable subject only to the statutory transfer process,
it has not taken such a position with regards to the small number of in-
dividual water rights represented by post-1907 permits issued by the
NMOSE before the creation of the MRGCD.292 As a result, the transfer-
ability of these water rights by individual users who have their water de-
livered by the MRGCD without the approval of the MRGCD is in doubt.
A third set of water rights were created when the MRGCD was
organized.293 The MRGCD claims water rights based on its mission and
the language of the Conservancy Act. Since the MRGCD was formed to
prevent floods, regulate stream channels and the flow of streams, divert
and control watercourses, drain and reclaim inundated lands, and to pro-
vide for irrigation and develop irrigable agricultural land,294 any new water
rights arising from new water supplies developed in connection with these
statutory responsibilities belong to the MRGCD.295 This position is sup-
ported by additional language in the Conservancy Act that declares any
water developed by a district in the pursuit of its statutory responsibilities
to be an appropriation that grants the district "the rights that go with
appropriation and beneficial use."29 Further, any disposition of this water
by a conservancy district is deemed a beneficial use.29v These new water
rights are confirmed by permits issued by the NMOSE several years after
290 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (West 2008).
291 SHAH, supra note 276, at 3.
292Id.
293 Id. Two other water rights in the MRGCD are reserved water rights owned by the six
Native American pueblos within the MRGCD that are senior to all other rights and indi-
vidual and MRGCD groundwater rights based on wells drilled before 1956 or permits
issued by the NMOSE after 1956. Id.
294 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-14-4(A) (West 2008).
295 DUMARS ETAL., supra note 273, at 2.
296 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-14-47(F) (West 2008); see also id. at 6.
297 DuMARS ET AL., supra note 273, at 6.
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the MRGCD was organized. Permit 0620 was approved by the NMOSE in
1931 based on an application to transfer perfected, pre-1907 water rights
for 80,785 acres through a change in the point of diversion.29 Permit 1690
granted the MRGCD surface water rights to 42,482 acres of land that were
waterlogged but would be drained by the MRGCD.299 Although the MRGCD
claims water rights through both its enabling legislation and permits,
counterarguments based on the language of the Conservancy Act raise the
issue of whether the MRGCD has the legal right to transfer water from
agricultural to municipal uses. A current MRGCD board member argues
that transfers from the MRGCD to municipalities are not sanctioned by its
enabling legislation since conservancy districts are formed for the limited
purposes of flood control, drainage, and agricultural irrigation.300
Issues have also arisen about the validity of the MRGCD's water
rights because farmers within the MRGCD are irrigating lands that repre-
sent less than 60% of the MRGCD's claimed water rights. The position
taken by the MRGCD is its water rights are not subject to forfeiture or
abandonment.30' According to the Conservancy Act, "The rights of the...
[conservancy] district to the waters of the district, or the use thereof, or
the land within the district and property owned by it shall not be lost by
the district by prescription or by adverse possession, or for nonuse of the
waters."3"2 The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that this provision of
the Conservancy Act "precludes abandonment of [a] conservancy district's
priority by non-use," noting that the "[loss of the priority date is often
tantamount to loss of the water right."30 3 In that case, a municipality
sought to defeat a priority call made by the conservancy district as a senior
appropriator by claiming that the nonuse provision of the Conservancy
Act violated the equal protection clause of New Mexico's Constitution since
conservancy districts were protected against non-use while other water
users were not."4 The New Mexico Supreme Court noted that conservancy
districts are different from other water users because they "were not likely
to waste water" and did not need "managerial oversight in order to assure
beneficial use."30 5 Thus, according to the New Mexico Supreme Court,
18 See id. at 7; Brown, supra note 266, at 8.
29 DUMARS ET AL., supra note 273, at 9; Brown, supra note 266, at 8-9.
3o Telephone Interview by Peter J. Hill with William M. Turner, Director-Position
No. 3, Bernalillo County in Albuquerque, N.M. (Jul. 15, 2008).
30l SHAH, supra note 276, at 4; see also DUMARS ET AL., supra note 273.
'o2 SHAH, supra note 276, at 4 (quoting N.M. Stat. § 73-17-21 (1978)).
Ro Eaton v. Vermejo Conservancy Dist., 678 P.2d 1170, 1175 (N.M. 1984).
3"0 N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18.
' Brown, supra note 266, at 12.
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Section 73-17-21 does not violate the equal protection clause
of the New Mexico Constitution. The legislature's distinc-
tion between conservancy districts and other appropriators
with respect to the loss of water rights through nonuse is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The legislature has cre-
ated an entire body of law pertaining specifically to conser-
vancy districts for the purpose of providing and maintaining
flood protection, river control, drainage, water storage for
irrigation needs and constructing and maintaining distri-
bution systems. Thus, the state's unique and extensive reg-
ulation of such districts ensures maximum beneficial use
of water. See NMSA 1978, § 73-14-1 to 73-19-5. Section 73-
17-21 is a rational part of that scheme." 6
Despite this precedent and the statutory language of the Conser-
vancy Act, several counterarguments have been raised concerning the
validity of the MRGCD's water rights due to nonuse.3°" First, since the
New Mexico Supreme Court has only addressed the common law doctrine
of abandonment, its decision does not preclude the MRGCD's loss of water
rights due to nonuse under statutory provisions in the water code related
to forfeiture," 8 or under the public interest standard,"0 9 or the public
welfare doctrine.310 Second, critics have accused the MRGCD of being in-
efficient1 and thus subject to the loss of water rights due to waste. In re-
sponse, the MRGCD has cut the amount of water it diverts from the Rio
Grande almost in half from 618,000 acre-feet in 1996 to 307,000 acre-feet
in 2006 through ditch lining, metering technology, and other initiatives.312
Third, the MRGCD has never applied for a proof of beneficial use with the
NMOSE describing the amount of water used and the number of acres
irrigated. William M. Turner, a member of the MRGCD's board of directors,
3 Raton, 678 P.2d at 1175.
307See Brown, supra note 266, at 14-17.
30 8 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28, 72-12-8 (West 2008); Brown supra note 266, at 14.
309 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23, 72-5-5.1 (West 2008).
310 Brown, supra note 266, at 14-17. The statutory forfeiture provisions indicate that they
apply to conservancy districts as well as other irrigation institutions. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-5-28(G) (West 2008).
Sl Kara Gillon, Watershed Down?: The Ups and Downs of Watershed Management in the
Southwest, 5 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 395, 416-17 (2002); Tania Soussan, Water Spigot
Tightens, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 30, 2004, at B1.31 2 Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, No Water to Spare: MRGCD Uses Technology to Keep Track of
the Resource Under Its Watch, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 17, 2007, at 1.
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argues that when farmers do not use their water, the MRGCD does not
have a clear claim to the water and cannot transfer it because of the fail-
ure to file proofs of beneficial use with the NMOSE.313 According to this
argument, the unused water rights revert back to the public domain and
the control of the NMOSE rather than remaining with the MRGCD. 314 To
address the issue of unused water rights, the MRGCD created a water
bank in 1995 to lease unused water rights.315 The water rights in the water
bank consist of the MRGCD's surplus water created by the loss of agri-
cultural lands to urbanization as well as deposits from individual holders
of pre-1907 water rights.31" Despite the MRGCD's hundreds of thousands
of acres and acre-feet of water rights, the water bank only had about sev-
enty leases that represented 850 acres of land and 1,800 acre-feet of water
per annum as of May 2007.31' Lawsuits about the legality of the MRGCD's
water bank program are ongoing.318 Compounding all these issues is the
lack of an official, judicial adjudication of the water rights in the Middle
Rio Grande Basin.319 As a result, all post-1907 water rights, including the
MRGCD's water rights, have not been quantified as to amount, ownership,
and priority. The NMOSE does not have an active adjudication in the
Middle Rio Grande Basin due to the lack of funding from the state leg-
islature and estimates that such an adjudication will cost $100 million,
take ten years, and affect at least 150,000 people. 320 The sum total of all
these issues cloud the title of water rights held by the MRGCD and make
their transferability less certain because all of these issues would be raised
by multiple parties in the statutory transfer process.
Acequias, traditional Hispanic community ditch associations, also
have a role in the anticommons effect associated with transfers of water
rights from the MRGCD. At the time of its formation, seventy-nine existing,
... Telephone Interview, supra note 300.314 Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, Water Bank Plea Rejected, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 17, 2007,
at 1.
315 SHAH, supra note 276, at 4; DUMARS ET AL., supra note 273, at 3.
316 SHAH, supra note 276, at 4; DUMARS ET AL., supra note 273, at 3.
317 DUMARS ETAL., supra note 273, at 4; see also SHAH, supra note 276, at 5. The water bank
had only grown from 1400 acre-feet per anum to 1,800 acre-feet between December 2000
and May 2007. Id.
3
' Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, MRGCD Lawsuit on Docket, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 15, 2007,
at Al.
319 See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to 72-4-19 (West 2008).
" Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, Water Rights Adjudication Put on Hold, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
March 28,2007, at 1 [hereinafter Water Rights]; Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, Acequia Group
Keeps Eye on Water Rights Rules, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 16, 2007, at 1.
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independent acequia systems were incorporated into the MRGCD, and
the MRGCD manages most of the acequias in its four county region.32' In
the United States, the acequia culture is unique to northern New Mexico
and southern Colorado and reflects a tradition in which water is viewed as
a community resource and decisions about water are made collectively.322
To support this acequia culture, the New Mexico state legislature granted
each acequia the right to veto any proposed transfers of water rights out
of its ditch system.323
Finally, the Bureau of Reclamation affects the transferability of
water from the MRGCD through its claims of ownership to water and
water-related infrastructure. "In 1963 the [MRGCD] contracted with the
Bureau of Reclamation for 20,900 acre-feet of water per anum from the
San Juan-Chama Project."32 Water from the Bureau carries with it all
the uncertainties described in Part II.C. supra. For example, the Bureau's
website states that the water contracted by the MRGCD is supplemental
water provided for irrigation, and there is an indication that the water
may not be transferable to other uses or may not be transferable if doing
so would impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.32 5 In
addition to issues about water, the MRGCD and the Bureau are engaged
in an ongoing dispute over who owns much of the MRGCD's infrastructure,
especially the El Vado Reservoir, the San Acacia Dam, and the Angastora
Dam.326 During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the MRGCD constructed
its four major diversion dams.327 However, during the 1940s, the MRGCD
became financially unstable and was unable to maintain its infrastruc-
ture.328 At the request of the MRGCD, the Bureau and the MRGCD en-
tered into a contract in 1951 in which the Bureau reconstructed and im-
proved the MRGCD's facilities and loaned the MRGCD $15,708,567 on
an interest-free basis for fifty years so that it could retire its existing
321 See Thompson, supra note 265, at 36; Juan-Carlos Rodriguez, Acequia Users Join on
Water Rights, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 28, 2006, at 1.
... See Greg Hanscom and Bruce Selcraig, Acequia Culture Feels Under the Gun, HIGH
CouNTRY NEWS, October 11, 1999, http://hcn.org/issues/164/5304.
323 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-24.1 (West 2008).
2 SHAH, supra note 276, at 4.
'
25 See USBOR.gov, Water Operations Group: Operations Fact Sheet El Vado Dam and
Reservoir, httpJ/www.usbr.gov/uealbug/water/sanjuanchama/reservoirs/fs/sjc_elvado.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
126 Tania Soussan, Denial of Bid a Blow to Water District, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 27, 2005,
at B1.
327 DUMARS ET AL., supra note 273.
31 SHAH, supra note 276, at 2.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL"Y REV.
bonds.329 In return, the Bureau received title to the MRGCD's dams,
canals, and ditches.33° Although the MRGCD paid off the debt in 1999, a
federal district court ruled in 2005 that the Bureau continued to own the
MRGCD's infrastructure since an act of Congress was required to transfer
title back to the MRGCD. 33' As described in Part II.C. supra, whenever the
Bureau claims ownership rights, water transfers are extremely compli-
cated since there is no clear mechanism by which reclamation water can
be legally moved from one party to another.
Another complicating factor involving the Bureau has been the
struggle over the Rio Grande silvery minnow, which has been declared
an endangered species.332 Under the Endangered Species Act,333 federal
agencies, such as the Bureau are prohibited from taking actions which
might undermine the survival of an endangered species .3 During drought
years, such as in 2002, the water used by the MRGCD, including water
from the Bureau's San Juan-Chama Project, lowers flows enough to place
the survival of the Rio Grande silvery minnow in question. 35 Given the
presence of reclamation water, conservation groups were able to use the
Endangered Species Act to compel the Bureau to modify its water contracts
and reduce water deliveries to users, including the MRGCD, to increase
the Rio Grande's instream flows for the benefit of the silvery minnow.33
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not accept the
Bureau's argument that the Endangered Species Act only applied to dis-
cretionary federal actions and that its contracts with water users such as
the MRGCD precluded such discretion.337 The ability of the Endangered
Species Act to override water contracts creates further doubt about the
ability of the MRGCD to enter into any water transfers from agricultural
to municipal uses.
The overall effect of all these issues is to create an anticommons
that makes the MRGCD's water unavailable to cities. A transfer by the
329 Id.
330 Soussan, supra note 326.
331 
Id.
33 Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F.Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (D.N.M. 2008).
3m 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2006).
3 See id.
3 5 Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 469 F.Supp. 2d at 1006.
See id. at 1011.
Beth Richards, Case Note, The Pump Don't Work Because the Bureau Took the Handle:
The United States Bureau of Reclamation's Discretion to Reduce Water Deliveries to Comply
with the Endangered Species Act. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109
(10th Cir. 2003), 4 WYO. L. REV. 113, 134-35 (2004).
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MRGCD would trigger the statutory transfer process and provide a forum
for both holders of use rights and veto rights to question the validity and
extent of the MRGCD's water rights. The tragedy of the anticommons
also extends outward from the MRGCD to include the entire Middle Rio
Grande Valley. As the NMOSE has noted about its Middle Rio Grande
Administrative Area:
Offsetting the effects of groundwater diversions is critical
to the conjunctive management of the water resources
within the Rio Grande stream system. Any existing per-
mittee requiring surface water rights for offset purposes
is confronted with finding a seller of valid surface water
rights and obtaining a permit from the State Engineer to
transfer the surface water rights. The transfer of surface
water rights within the Rio Grande stream system is a com-
plicated and often lengthy process due to complex inter-
relationship between the surface and ground waters, the
numerous existing appropriations to be protected, and the
diversity of the numerous interests having standing to par-
ticipate in the administrative process for an application for
a permit. Because a transfer application can be denied or
approved and the decision appealed to the district court,
the court of appeals and the state supreme court, the final
decision may be far removed from the time the application
was filed.33
Although the MRGCD in the Middle Rio Grande Valley would be a logical
source of water for nearby growing urban areas, such as Santa Fe, the
tragedy of the anticommons has meant that these cities must look to other
geographic areas and entities for transfers of water rights, even if those
sources are politically or hydrologically questionable. Santa Fe discovered
a double effect of the tragedy of the anticommons when it tried to buy two
billion gallons of groundwater rights in the Estancia Basin, which borders
the Middle Rio Grande Valley. The first effect was the tragedy of the anti-
commons in the MRGCD and the Middle Rio Grande Valley that drove
Santa Fe to a source such as the Estancia Basin. The second effect occurred
when Santa Fe tried to transfer water out of the Estancia Basin and
experienced the tragedy of the anticommons in a very direct manner.
s TURNEY, supra note.283, at 2.
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B. The Estancia Basin
The Estancia Basin is located roughly in the center of New Mexico,
south of Santa Fe and southeast of Albuquerque and consists of approxi-
mately 2,260 square miles.339 The western edge of the Estancia Basin bor-
ders on the Middle Rio Grande Basin.34' As a closed basin, the Estancia
Basin does not receive any surface water from outside its bowl-shaped
boundaries, does not contain any perennial streams, and does not release
any surface waters to other watersheds or basins. 1 As a result, "[tihe resi-
dents and economy of the Estancia Basin relies solely of [sic] the precipi-
tation and groundwater for the water supply," with the Valley Fill Aquifer
as the primary groundwater source.342 Most of the Estancia Basin is rural
and 97% of the water use in the basin is agricultural, although residen-
tial housing for Santa Fe and Albuquerque is expanding southward and
eastward into the Estancia Basin.343
Although the prior appropriation doctrine applies to both sur-
face water and groundwater in New Mexico,'" regulations issued by the
NMOSE to conserve groundwater aquifers by balancing the interests of
senior and junior groundwater appropriators have been upheld, especially
in cases of groundwater mining.' Since 1965 the NMOSE has treated the
Estancia Basin as a mined basin because groundwater is pumped in excess
of the natural recharge.346 However, its status as a mined basin has not
prevented the NMOSE-declared water rights in the Estancia Basin from
exceeding the water that is beneficially used by a factor of three or four. 7
As a result, in 2001, the NMOSE issued an order "denying new ground-
water appropriations in the [Estancia Basin] and setting limits on ground-
water level declines."348 In 2002, the NMOSE issued guidelines that
339 ESTANcIA BASIN REGIONAL WATER PLAN: YEAR 2008 UPDATE (FINAL DRAFT) 4-1 (2008)
[hereinafter ESTANCIA BASIN].
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 4-3.
3Id. at 4-1, 4-11.
34 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1, 72-12-1 (West 2008).
' Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 772 (N.M. 1966).
36 ESTANCIA BASIN, supra note 339, at 4-3, 5-2.
147 Id. at 4-4. Water rights in the Estancia Basin had not been adjudicated in 2004, and,
as of 2008, "it is not anticipated that the Estancia Basin water rights adjudication will
be completed in the near future and likely not within the 40-year planning window of the
[Estancia Basin Regional Water] Plan." Id. at 5-3.
34s THoMAs C. TURNEY, OFFICE OF THE N.M. STATE ENG'R, ESTANCIA UNDERGROUND
WATER BASIN GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS 4 (2002).
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replaced the 1965 mined basin policies.' 9 Among other things, the new
guidelines established critical management areas where the Valley Fill
Aquifer was thin or where water levels were insufficient for sustained
pumping and "adopt[ed] detailed enforcement provisions to cancel water
rights which have not been developed."35 ° "However, as of June 2008, "the
implementation of these forfeiture guidelines has not been actively pur-
sued by the NMOSE beyond initial issuance of potential water rights for-
feiture letters."35' In addition, while the NMOSE's guidelines stated that
transfers into a critical management area would be denied, the guide-
lines did not address the transfer of water out of the Estancia Basin to
another basin.35 2
During 2004, the City of Santa Fe negotiated with Sierra Water-
works LLC for the sale, and transfer, of water rights that had been used
in the Estancia Basin. Sierra Waterworks had been incorporated in 2003
by a group of Estancia Basin farmers, including the then-incoming board
president of the New Mexico Association of Conservation Districts, to con-
struct and maintain reservoirs, canals, and pipelines.353 The company was
headquartered in Moriarty, a town in the Estancia Basin about fifty miles
south of Santa Fe, and owned an 8,702 acre farm in the Estancia Basin
that had been used for grazing and to grow alfalfa and corn silage.3z
Sierra Waterworks pumped 14,500 acre-feet per year from wells located
on the farm, which was within the NMOSE's estimates of 2.5 acre-feet of
water per irrigated acre.355
The proposal that was negotiated between the city and the com-
pany was announced by Santa Fe Mayor Larry Delgado on December 23,
2004.356 Under the proposal, Santa Fe would pay $27 million for a 51%
ownership interest in the Sierra Waterworks' farm and its 7,200 acre-feet
per annum of associated water rights.35 7 Sierra Waterworks would retain
349 ESTANCIA BASIN, supra note 339, at 8-9.
35 Id. at 8-1, 8-7.
351 Id. at 5-4.
352 Id.
3' Huddy, supra note 243.
354 id.
151 John T. Huddy & Kathy Louise Schuit, Valley Residents Unite, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Jan. 13, 2005, available at http://mvtelegraph.com/287215mtnviewOl-13-05.htm.
" Huddy, supra note 243.
17 Id. Although the Sierra Waterworks pumped 14,500 acre-feet per annum from its
farm, the change in water rights from agricultural to urban use would have reduced the
amount that could be transferred by approximately half since only about half the water
that is used for irrigating crops is consumed and the rest evaporates into the atmosphere
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a 49% interest, and the farm and water rights would be held by Santa Fe
and Sierra Waterworks as joint tenants, giving each party an undivided
interest in the whole.35 Sierra Waterworks would sell its interest in the
water rights to Santa Fe based on a reasonable market price per acre-foot,
and Santa Fe would lease its interest in the remainder of the farm back
to Sierra Waterworks, which would continue ranching operations using
a small number of windmill-driven livestock wells.359 To secure its option
to the farm and water rights, Santa Fe would pay Sierra Waterworks $6
million over three years, which would either be applied to the $27 million
purchase price if the transaction was finalized or be forfeited.36 However,
the total cost of obtaining the water was estimated at $127 million when
an additional $100 million was included to pay for sixty-five miles of pipe-
line and rights of ways to transport the water from the Estancia Basin to
the city and for a water treatment plant to desalinate the brackish water
via a reverse osmosis process.3 6' Santa Fe anticipated funding the project
infrastructure costs through a combination of long-term bonds and state
and federal government assistance.362 Water delivery was predicted to
begin sometime between 2010 and 2012, but the water would be subject
to the NMOSE's forty year planning window for pumping groundwater
out of a mined basin.363
The supporters of the proposal, which was ultimately whittled
down to Mayor Delgado, Sierra Waterworks, and an unknown number
of anonymous Estancia Basin farmers who were also interested in selling
their water rights to Santa Fe and other buyers outside the basin, iden-
tified several benefits. 3 ' First, the transfer of water rights would allow
Santa Fe to slow the heavy rate of pumping from its current groundwater
wells.365 Second, the infrastructure created to transport the water to Santa
Fe would create the backbone for a regional water system that could
deliver water for residential, commercial, and industrial uses and spur
or seeps back into the ground. Id. By transferring less than half of its water rights, Sierra
Waterworks argued that the transaction would have no hydrological impact on the Estancia
Basin.
358 Id.
359 Id.; Tania Soussan, Cities Covet Rural Water, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 23, 2005.
3' Huddy, supra note 243.
361 Id.
362 id.
363 Id.; ESTANCIA BASIN, supra note 339, at 5-2.
1 See Huddy, supra note 243.
365 See id.
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economic development in the Estancia Basin.366 Third, for many farmers,
selling their water rights would be more profitable than continuing mar-
ginal agricultural activities.6 7 Finally, Sierra Waterworks argued that its
crops consumed more water than the NMOSE's estimates, which meant
that the Estancia Basin would experience a hydrological gain since less
than half of the 14,500 acre-feet of water rights were being transferred.3"
The announcement of the proposed transfer on the day before
Christmas Eve in 2004 did not go unnoticed. An emergency meeting called
by the Estancia Basin Water Planning Committee, a regional water re-
sources advisory committee consisting of public officials and private citi-
zens, on January 6, 2005 was moved from the county courthouse to the
county fairgrounds to accommodate the more than 200 people who at-
tended.369 At the meeting, many spoke against the proposal and no one
spoke in favor of the proposal.37° By mid January 2005, the Torrance
County Commission, the largest county by area in the Estancia Basin,
as well as the town councils of the larger towns had unanimously passed
resolutions opposing the transfer and had drafted letters to send to the
NMOSE.37' The Estancia Valley Economic Development Association issued
a statement indicating that an increase in water exports from the Estancia
Basin appeared counterproductive to its mission of promoting economic
development while preserving the quality of life and unique characteristics
of the Estancia Valley.7 2 The biggest setback for supporters of the proposal
was the creation of the Estancia Basin Resources Association, a grassroots
activist organization that opposed transfers from the Estancia Basin.373
About 200 people attended the first public meeting of the Estancia Basin
Resources Association on January 14, 2005, and the group was instru-
mental in packing the subsequent Santa Fe City Council meetings with
Estancia Basin and Santa Fe residents opposed to the transfer.
374
3' Kathy Louise Schuit, Some Say WaterPlan to BenefitAll, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Jan. 6,2005,
available at http://www.emtelegraph.com/283919mtnviewOl-06-05.htm.
367 Soussan, supra note 359.
'" See id.; Schuit, supra note 366.
369 Shellie Langley, We Must Protect Basin Water, ALBUQUERQUE J. Jan., 13, 2005.
370 Huddy & Schuit, supra note 355. The Estancia Basin Water Resources Planning
Committee remained neutral in the controversy and was criticized for its position and lack
of preparedness in responding to the Sierra Waterworks-Santa Fe proposed transfer. Id.
371 Water Transfer Hot Topic, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 13, 2005.
372 Id.
173 Estancia Basin Resource Association, httpJ/www.estanciabasin.org/(lastvisited Apr. 22,
2009).
374 Kathy Louise Schuit, Estancia Valley Politicians Lead Charge Against Water Plan,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 18, 2005.
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The political firestorm proved to be too great for Mayor Delgado
and his supporters. Passage of an ordinance by the Santa Fe City Council
required two public hearings, and, at the first public hearing, only the
Sierra Waterworks' president spoke in favor of the proposal.3 75 At the
second public hearing on January 26, 2005, action on the proposal was
postponed indefinitely, and the city staff was directed to cease pursuing
any further negotiations with Sierra Waterworks on the proposal.376
Since the proposal was defeated before the Santa Fe City Council,
Sierra Waterworks never filed an application to transfer water rights with
the NMOSE because the company never had a buyer.3 77 Although some
of the arguments against the proposal, especially by Santa Fe residents,
were critical of the economics of the deal and its impact on water rates
when combined with the $60 million dollars Santa Fe had already com-
mitted to the San Juan-Chama Project, many of the arguments made in
the media and before the Santa Fe City Council were dress rehearsals for
the arguments the opponents anticipated making at hearings before the
NMOSE.3 7' These arguments cumulatively create an anticommons in at-
tempts to transfer water from agricultural to urban and other uses, and
this anticommons effect exists independent of the underlying merits of
any individual transfer.
One of the major issues raised by a transfer of water rights that
involves a change in the place and type of use is the validity of the water
right.379 Since water rights in the Estancia Basin have not been adjudicated
and the Estancia Basin Water Planning Committee estimates "that three
or four times the amount of water rights are recognized by the NMOSE
than have been beneficially used in the Estancia Basin,"3 0 opponents
were in a position to raise the issue of whether the Sierra Waterworks'
water rights were "paper" rights that had either been abandoned or for-
feited or whether they were "wet" rights supported by beneficial use.381
In addition, questions were raised over whether Sierra Waterworks was
... John T. Huddy & Laura Banish, Council Hears Water Fears, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 13,
2005.
376 John T. Huddy, Santa Fe City Council Kills Estancia Basin Water Plan, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Jan. 27, 2005.
37' George Johnson, Dispatches from the Water Wars, THE SANTA FE REvIEw, Sept. 17,
2004, http://santafereview.com/ reviewl.l.html.
378 Id.
371 See supra Part II.D.
o ESTANCIA BASIN, supra note 339, at 5-3.
3' Huddy & Schuit, supra note 355.
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pumping more water than needed for its agricultural (i.e., beneficial) use
solely to have more water to transfer to Santa Fe.3" 2
The New Mexico water code and the NMOSE's rules and regula-
tions outline another set of issues available to opponents of a transfer of
water rights.3" In evaluating a proposed water rights transfer, the NMOSE
is required to evaluate whether the transfer "can be made without detri-
ment to existing water rights and are not contrary to conservation of water
within the state and not detrimental to the public welfare of the state."3"
As a result, opponents of the proposed Sierra Waterworks transfer could
question whether the pumping and exportation of groundwater from the
Estancia Basin would negatively impact holders of senior water rights
and whether it was consistent with water conservation, especially given
the NMOSE's guidelines for the sustainability of the groundwater supply
in the Estancia Basin as a closed, mined basin.385
The public welfare requirement provided opponents of the Sierra
Waterworks-Santa Fe proposal who did not have any water rights directly
impacted by the transfer with arguments to use against the transfer, espe-
cially since the phrase "public welfare" is not defined and is somewhat
elastic.386 With an interbasin transfer, one issue raised by the public wel-
fare requirement is who has a public welfare claim. Some of the possible
claimants included: the residents of the Estancia Basin, the residents of
Santa Fe, or the citizens of New Mexico. After the Sierra Waterworks-
Santa Fe water rights transfer was defeated, the Estancia Basin Regional
Water Plan was updated to clarify that "the exportation of water from
the Estancia Basin runs counter to the public welfare of the Estancia
Basin" especially given "the inevitable supply versus demand deficiency"
created by the mining of a closed basin.387 However, the updated plan
also notes that "the New Mexico State Water Plan (2003) suggests that the
NMOSE reserves the right to implement water policies that may not be
consistent with the public welfare of specific regions but that are consis-
tent with the public welfare of the State of New Mexico." 3' To overcome
382 Soussan, supra note 359.
383 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (West 2008); N.M. ADMIN. CODE 19.26.2.11.B. (Weil 2005).
384 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (West 2008); N.M. ADMIN. CODE 19.26.2.11.B. (Weil 2005).
' Shellie Langley, We Must Protect Basin Water, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Jan. 13, 2005, available
at http://www.mvtelegraph.com/opinion/287224mtnopedOl-13-05.htm.
NEW MEXICO INTERSTATE STREAM COMMISSION, REGIONAL WATER PLANNING ADVISORY
COUNcIL, REVISED MEETING NOTES 3 (2009).
387 ESTANCIA BASIN, supra note 339, at 5-5, 8-7.
3
ms Id. at 8-7 to 8-8.
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these interbasin transfer issues in a public welfare review before the
NMOSE, opponents of the proposed Sierra Waterworks-Santa Fe transfer
were prepared to make the following arguments, which ultimately present
the public welfare as a dichotomy between rural versus urban, agricultural
versus residential and commercial, and poor versus rich:3 9
* The residents of the Estancia Basin are part of
a long-standing community, and the farmers and
ranchers of the Estancia Basin are currently making
a contribution to New Mexico through their agri-
cultural activities.
The Estancia Basin has plans for future economic
activity, perhaps industrial, commercial, and resi-
dential development linked to the growing commu-
nities near Albuquerque along the northwestern
edge that will benefit New Mexico and that require
keeping water in the Estancia Basin.
Santa Fe already has groundwater available in
the Espanola Basin and is attempting to mine the
Estancia Basin simply to avoid mining its own aqui-
fers. Thus a city with political power is attempting
to take water from a region that has less political
clout, and Santa Fe becomes to the Estancia Basin
what Los Angeles was to the Owens Valley in the
early 1900s.39°
The Estancia Basin does not have enough water
to meet its long-term needs since groundwater is
currently being pumped faster than it is being re-
plenished.
9 Schuit, supra note 374; see also Estancia Basin Resource Association, Talking Points,
http://www.estanciabasin.org/talkingpoints.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
" The perception is that Los Angeles "stole" the water from the Owens Valley. Libecap
argues that the transaction was profitable for both Los Angeles and the Owens Valley
farmers, but there was controversy over the division of the gains from trade. LLBECAP,
supra note 121.
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Although these arguments were never made before the NMOSE,
the Estancia Basin Resource Association did not disappear with the defeat
of the proposal before the Santa Fe City Council and stands ready to assert
them. Each month, the organization studies reports issued by the NMOSE
to determine if anyone in the Estancia Basin is selling water rights that
will result in a transfer out of the Estancia Basin.39' In 2006, the Estancia
Basin Resources Organization had raised $55,000 toward its goal of devel-
oping a $120,000 war chest to fund future legal battles related to transfers
from the Estancia Basin.392
In addition to its goal of creating a legal fund, after the defeat of
the proposed Sierra Waterworks-Santa Fe transfer, the Estancia Basin
Resources Organization also pursued legislation to protect the ground-
water supply of the Estancia Basin.393 After extensive lobbying by the
organization, the New Mexico legislature passed Senate Joint Memorial
17 highlighting the need for transfers of mined groundwater from the
Estancia Basin to be "consistent with the public welfare of New Mexico
and not contrary to the planning objectives within a regional water plan."3
The memorial requests that the NMOSE, when evaluating applications
to transfer groundwater from the Estancia Basin, require "proof of a need
in the importing basin" and "proof that there are no alternative available
in-basin sources of water to supply the region seeking to import ground
water from the Estancia [B]asin. "395 A memorial is not a statute and is not
presented to the governor for signature, hence the "request" made to the
NMOSE. Since Senate Joint Memorial 17 was drafted with the assistance
of both the Estancia Basin Resources Association and the NMOSE, and the
State Engineer spoke in support of the memorial before the New Mexico
Senate Rules Committee, the request will likely be honored. By providing
yet another tool for opponents of transfers from the Estancia Basin, the
memorial magnifies the anticommons effect on such transfers.396
Mayor Larry Delgado and the Santa Fe City Council experienced
in a very public and painful manner the impact of the anticommons on
water transfers. Given that it is a topographically closed basin that is cur-
rently being mined, the Estancia Basin was probably not the best source of
31 Beth Hahn, Valley Prepares to Protect Water, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 5, 2006.
392 Id.
3' The Estancia Basin Resource Association, Regulatory Update, httpJ/www.estanciabasin
.org/regupdate.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
31 S.J. Mem. 17, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/
Sessions/08%2ORegular/memorials/senate/SJM017.pdf.
3 95 Id.
" Laura Nesbitt, Estancia Basin Memorial OKId. ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 21, 2008.
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new water rights for the City of Santa Fe.397 A more logical source of water
for the Santa Fe area is the nearby Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District,39 which has been accused of both inefficiency in the distribution
and use of water and of illegally holding unused water rights through its
own internal water bank. However, given the anticommons effect associ-
ated with water transfers generally and with water transfers from irri-
gation and conservancy districts specifically, the water markets in the
West do not always function efficiently. As a result, municipalities, such
as Santa Fe, are tempted to pursue proposals that do not necessarily make
sense economically or environmentally to satisfy political promises made
to urban constituents about the availability of water for current and future
needs.
CONCLUSION
The tragedy of the anticommons, a situation where several entities
without use rights have the right to exclude new uses of a resource, ex-
plains an economic anomaly. In the face of increasing demand for water
for urban and environmental uses in the western United States water
transfers out of agriculture have been fewer than one would expect based
on price differentials, and most of those that have occurred have required
extensive negotiations.399 The potential for lawsuits that will negate any
transfer contracts also exists.
The multiple exclusion rights are the result of the evolutionary
path of water institutions and the expansion of certain legal doctrines,
such as the public interest and public trust doctrines. Those doctrines
were originally quite limited and had the effect of protecting the property
rights of people who used navigable waters and who depended on return
flows from other irrigators. The efforts to recognize the increased value
of non-agricultural water could have been directed to better measuring
rights through more precise quantification of the actual nature of the right
and the amount of return flow. Instead the path has been one of increased
ambiguity as to the legal standing of a water right. Along with this ambi-
guity came increased claims of legal standing in water transfer disputes.
... Menking et al., Model Estimates of Runoff in the Closed, Semiarid Estancia Basin,
Central New Mexico, USA, 48 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 953, 953 (2003), available at http:l/
www.atypon-link.com/IAHS/doi/pdf/10.1623/hysj.48.6.953.51424.398 See supra Part IV.B.
' See generally Brewer et al., supra note 4 (discussing the increase in transfers over time).
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Both the public interest and public trust doctrines, as presently inter-
preted, present a wide variety of opportunities for numerous parties to
claim injury from a water transfer.
To further complicate matters, the rules governing the operation
of mutual companies and irrigation districts were designed to facilitate
intra-organization movement of water, but also made transfer outside of
the organization difficult. The Bureau of Reclamation was created explicitly
to deliver water to agriculture so the rules governing transfer of Bureau
water are ambiguous and replete with veto opportunities. Thus it is accu-
rate to say that in water markets "' [a inticommons' is a useful metaphor
for understanding how and why economic value can disappear into the
'black hole' of resource utilization.
40 0
4 Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 14, at 2.
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